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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of this project is to survey the 
acquisition workforce regarding recent GAO reports and 
statements made on Award and Incentive Fees. The reports 
entitled, “DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees 
regardless of Outcomes” and “DOD Wastes Billions of Dollars 
through Poorly Structured Incentive Fees” have questioned 
the acquisition methods’ effectiveness. In order to analyze 
the reports, the researchers have conducted background 
research on the proper use and facilitation of Award and 
Incentive Fees in accordance with Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) standards, DoD 5000 policy, and other 
applicable policies.   
The research team surveyed a sample size of contracting 
managers at the 45th Annual Aerospace and Defense Contract 
Management Conference.  The focus of the Conference, “Rules, 
Risks, and Rewards: The Changing Outlook for Aerospace and 
Defense Contracting”, presented an opportunity for the 
researchers to survey participants who felt strongly about 
the GAO statements. Because the survey was conducted in 
anonymity, the research team was able to gather both 
positive and negative feedback. 
The following are the major findings of the research:  
 
The first statement examines DoD programs, which do not 
rely on Award-fees to motivate contractors to achieve 
desired acquisition outcomes.  Almost half of the 
Government personnel surveyed agreed with this 
statement.   
The second statement examines the Government awarding a 
significant portion of the available Award-fee to the 
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contractor for “satisfactory” performance.  Just under 
half of the Government respondents agreed with this 
statement.  
The third statement examines deferred fees or 
“rollovers.”  More than 50% of the Government respondents 
agreed with this statement, while the majority of 
contractors stayed neutral.  
In addition to these, finding contributors too many of 
the finings per the responses indicated on the Government 
and contractor surveys suggested that the DoD require 
improvement in the areas of training, administration, and 
implementation of Award and Incentive Fees. Incentive and 
Award-fee contracts offer the Government a way to encourage 
contractors to achieve exceptional performance.  The 
Government, however, must fully understand how to relate 
performance-evaluation factors to the program outcome, and 
then communicate that relationship clearly to the 
contractor.  Partnerships between both parties can create 
more risk-sharing and open communication to mitigate 
acquisition delays and cost overruns. This notion places an 




A.  INTRODUCTION 
This introductory chapter will provide the reader a 
comprehensive outline of the research paper in its entirety.  
In addition, brief summations of each chapter and subsection 
will be incorporated to inform the reader about the 
specifics of each section.  This section includes a synopsis 
of the background, problem statements, purpose of the 
research, scope and methodology, organization of the paper, 
and finally closes with the researchers’ view of the 
benefits of the study. According to the GAO, 
The power of monetary Incentive Fees to motivate 
excellent contactor performance and improve 
acquisition outcomes is diluted by the way that 
DOD structures and implements Incentive Fees […] 
[T]he Department of Defense (DOD) has paid 
billions of Award-fees and Incentive Fees to 
discover that fees are not an effective tool for 
achieving DOD’s desired acquisition outcomes. 
(GAO, 2005, December, Intro)   
B.  BACKGROUND 
Collectively, the Department of Defense (DoD) gives its 
contractors the opportunity to earn billions of dollars 
through monetary Incentive Fees (GAO, 2005, December, 
Intro).  The GAO’s inference of mismanagement and 
uncertainty has the Award and Incentive Fees Fee function of 
Government contracting under scrutiny.  In the opinion of 
the GAO, the acquisition community has begun to accept a 
lassiez-faire notion of providing near maximum fee award to 
contractors for “par” or “sub-par” performance.  Contract 
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managers imply this practice is needed to motivate 
contractors considering solicitations’ technical complexity, 
unrealistic requirements, stringent time constraints and the 
uncertainty of funds and/or follow-on contracts.   As a 
result, the DoD has paid out an estimated $8 billion in 
Award-fees to date on Government contracts...regardless of 
the outcome (GAO, 2005, December, Intro).  This finding has 
added “fuel to the fire,” driving continual congressional 
propositions for acquisition reform.  The DoD acquisition 
community continues to seek and apply process improvements 
from various forms of industry and leadership.  From the 
“lean” principles utilized by Toyota Motor Company, to 
current implementations of varying purchasing strategies, 
the Government continues to value sound applications that 
appear to be a “one size fits all” solution.   
The acquisition community has been in, and continues to 
be in, a quest for transformation and reform.  At the 2006 
World Wide Contracting Conference, Mr. Charles Williams, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contracting, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, 
challenged the acquisition community, “regardless of what 
level you are at, SES, General Officer, or GS-5 […] we must 
embrace change and transformation” (Williams, 2006).  This 
challenge is indicative of the need for acquisition 
professionals to introduce entrepreneurial methodologies 
into the community as well as the need for members of the 
community to analyze DoD Incentive Fees practices and their 
net benefit to Government contracting. Other than 
organizational metrics, there is not an overall system that 
independently assesses or measures Award and Incentive Fee  
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outcomes. This fact catalyzes the Government to ask the 
question, do Award and Incentive Fees accomplish their 
intended objective?   
In the past decade, Government spending on acquisitions 
has increased dramatically.   Civilian and military leaders 
have made changes, such as program cuts, to assist in 
budgetary shortfalls necessary to contribute to the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT) and OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.  
With increasing pressure to contribute to the war effort and 
recapitalize our aging infrastructure, senior DoD and 
service acquisition officials are seeking ways and inventing 
places to reduce costs and risks.  Because of this mandate, 
many have raised concerns about the effectiveness of these 
obligated fees, specifically Award and Incentive Fees. 
Recent reports assert that DoD programs paid large fees on 
acquisitions that are “falling behind schedule, overrunning 
costs, and experiencing significant technical problems” 
(GAO, 2005, December, p. 2). In a statement released to the 
Air Force Times, Lt. Col Edwards of the 88th Comptroller 
Squadron displayed the realism of the budget shortfalls when 
he stated, "this really is about readiness […] increasing 
ops tempo […] and budget challenges across the board.  This 
budget issue affects all of us.  We simply cannot afford not 
to […] invest in our future.  This mandate is affecting 
operational readiness and support functions of many 
installations” (Kaufman, 2007). He went on to say, “It won’t 
be easy” (2007).    
As many installations face the challenges of 
redistribution of funds and constant manning shortages, the 
acquisition community must be prepared to make decisions 
that will contribute to strategic objectives implemented by 
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our acquisition leadership.  This may involve a greater 
focus on the distribution of Award and Incentive Fees. 
DoD acquisition personnel are continuously tasked to 
make sound business decisions on a tactical and strategic 
level.  This is specifically true where they must identify 
their budget as a constraint and resourcefully provide 
optimization to maximize the efficiency of monies spent for 
commodities and services.  The GAO suggests portions of the 
acquisition fee system are unable to motivate the contractor 
to perform, thus asserting that many contracts are not 
meeting cost or performance targets (GAO, 2005, December, p. 
29). Regardless of the findings, it is part of the 
acquisition professionals’ fiduciary duty to adhere to the 
responsibilities delegated. In the acquisition community, 
professionals must determine and employ the most efficient 
methodologies to achieve the desired end-state of the 
contract. Award-fees and Incentive Fees are the most 
commonly used means for achieving those results.   
The existence or application of well-developed 
and well-implemented monetary Incentive Fees 
alone does not determine the overall success or 
failure of an acquisition. DOD acquisition 
programs operate in an environment with 
underlying pressures and Incentive Fees that 
drive both program and contractor behavior. 
Competition for funding and contracts leads to 
situations, especially in major system 
acquisitions, in which costs are underestimated 
and capabilities are over-promised. Resulting 
problems require additional time and money to 
address. At the same time, DOD customers are 
tolerant of cost overruns and delays in order to 
get a high-performance weapon system. DOD’s 
current approach toward monetary Incentive Fees 
reflects these realities and has resulted in a 
failure to hold contractors accountable for 
delivering and supporting fielded capabilities 
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within cost and schedule baselines. While DOD and 
contractors share the responsibility for program 
success, Award and Incentive Fees, to be 
effective, need to be realigned with acquisition 
outcomes. Awarding large amounts of fee for 
satisfactory or lesser performance and offering 
contractors multiple chances to earn previously 
withheld fees has fostered an environment in 
which DOD expects to pay and contractors expect 
to receive most of the available Award-fee 
regardless of outcomes. In addition, DOD’s lack 
of information on how well Award and Incentive 
Fees are achieving their intended purpose leaves 
the department vulnerable to millions of dollars 
of potential waste. Successes do exist at the 
individual contract level, but DOD will need to 
leverage this knowledge if it hopes to identify 
proven Incentive Fees strategies across a wide 
variety of DOD acquisitions. (GAO, 2005, 
December, p. 33)   
If DoD procurement is not achieving these objectives, 
acquisition personnel must understand why and begin to 
implement changes to correct the discrepancies. Active 
contract managers must be surveyed to determine if 
statements made by the GAO correlate with the field use of 
Award and Incentive Fees.  By obtaining this feedback, 
researchers will assist in identifying areas of improvement 
for involved agencies, thus assisting contract managers in 
resource focusing. 
C. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this project is to survey the 
acquisition workforce regarding recent GAO reports and 
statements made on Award and Incentive Fees.  The GAO 
excerpt of information is based on a sample size of 52 
contracts containing Award-fee provisions.  In addition, 27 
were Incentive Fee provisions, and 14 contracts contained 
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both, based on a “probability sample of 93 contracts from 
the study population of 597 DoD Award and Incentive Fee 
contracts that were active and had a fee valued at $10 
million or more from fiscal year 1999 through 2003” (GAO, 
2005, December, Intro).  This report focuses on the improper 
outcomes of and the administration of Award and Incentive 
Fees.  The research will gather feedback based on an 
anonymous survey (see Appendices C and D) provided at the 
45th Annual Aerospace and Defense Contract Management 
Conference held in Garden Grove, CA.   The research intent 
is to take the statements from the GAO reports and determine 
if the GAO’s findings are reflective of the administrative 
and contractual actions of Government and contract 
management professionals.  
There were a multitude of reasons that the researchers 
chose to review Award and Incentive Fees.  The end objective 
is to inform Government contract managers of areas of 
improvement within the Award and Incentive Fee structure 
that can maximize the intended value of each procurement and 
minimize the inefficiencies that hinder it.  
Because of this focus, the research will assist in 
vectoring resources to mitigate the issues and highlight the 
recommendations for improvement that may affect the 
acquisition community more than others.  This will also give 
the DoD and interested industry partners follow-on topics 
for future research.   
Although these are not the only available Incentive Fee 
arrangements the Government has at its disposal, they are 
the primary ones utilized and will, therefore, be our 
research focus.   
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D. PROBLEM STATEMENTS  
The GAO essentially evaluated 93 varying DoD contracts 
with Award and Incentive Fee combinations.  Three of the 
primary findings of GAO were that the DoD: 
• Evaluates contractors on Award-fee criteria that are 
not directly related to key acquisition outcomes; 
• Pays  contractors  a significant portion of the 
available fee for what award plans describe as 
“acceptable, average, expected of satisfactory 
performance”; and 
• Gives the contractors at least a second opportunity to 
earn initially unearned or deferred fees. 
The researchers will incorporate these overall conclusions 
into two separate survey statements (see Appendices C and D) 
to gather information on Award and Incentive Fees. Survey 
findings will be incorporated into the methodology. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope of this MBA project will analyze Award-fee 
and Incentive Fee portions of Government contracting, which 
(according to the GAO) are currently ineffective in 
providing correct fee compensation for contract performance 
outcomes. With that notion, the researchers will communicate 
the GAO statements to real-world acquisition professionals 
in order to determine, by surveying contract managers, if 
there is concurrence.  At the conclusion of our research, we 
will analyze the findings and determine if there are any 
similarities between the assessment of the GAO findings and 
the “reality” of procurement contracting involving business 
transactions.  
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The methodology of this research will be by survey and 
anonymous correspondence.  The following section entitled 
“organization of the study” will outline the specific 
sections of the research paper as well as how the research 
in each section shall be obtained.  In addition, this brief 
section will explain the rationale and the importance of 
each sub-section of the project. Research will be conducted 
by reviewing GAO reports 06-66 and 06-409T to extract GAO 
statements.  In its review of the reports, the research team 
has established the foundation of research and shall provide 
a comprehensive analysis at the conclusion of the research. 
In order to understand the report terminology, literature 
reviews using scholarly periodicals and other means shall be 
used to establish the proper usage and administration of 
Award and Incentive Fees. 
The 45th Annual Aerospace and Defense Contract 
Management Conference will be the primary collection point 
for information.  The research team anticipates that by 
obtaining real-world information from contract managers in 
the field, a better assessment of day-to-day operations can 
be derived.  The researchers, using feedback and analysis 
from these findings, will evaluate the analyzed survey of 
respondents to conclude if, in fact, the GAO statements are 
commensurate with the surveyed responses.  Based upon the 
findings of the research, the conclusion will introduce 
possibilities for further research regarding the use and 
control of Award and Incentive Fees. 
1. Limitations of the Study  
The research conducted is based on qualitative 
information derived from a Likert scale survey.  The 
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qualitative assessments do not have any statistical 
inferences based on the surveyed population, and, therefore, 
are not analyzed herein.  The Likert model uses subjective 
or objective statements in order to obtain the surveyed 
respondent’s opinion (see Appendices C and D).  
F.  BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
 The benefits of this study are that it will provide the 
DoD with insight that will assist in the development of 
innovative ways to replicate tangible Incentive Fees that 
will motivate contractors to perform and produce above 
satisfactory performance. In efforts to mitigate many of the 
current issues that are not consistent with established 
policy and procedure, such as awarding contractors for 
exemplary performance, this research intends to produce 
alternative means with which the DoD can reward contractors 
for above-standard performance and penalize them for below-
standard performance, as applicable. 
 In addition, the GAO cited that contracting officials 
have stated there are few mechanisms to share lessons 
learned and innovative practices (GAO, 2005, December, 
Intro). This report will serve as another avenue through 
which to convey much-needed information regarding Incentive 
Fees. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH PAPER 
1. Chapter I Introduction     
The introduction portion of this research paper will 
identify the scope of the research area.  It is divided into 
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subsections that aim to clarify the research.  The 
introduction synopsizes the research paper and contains the 
following sections: introduction, background, purpose of 
research, problem statements, scope and methodology, 
organization of the research paper, and the benefits of the 
study.  The intent is to discuss the GAO reports’ 
generalities and identify the speculations that they cast on 
the current acquisition profession as a whole. 
2. Chapter II Background and Conceptual 
Framework 
The focus of the second chapter will be to explore the 
basic premise and rationale for the GAO’s investigation of 
the DoD usage of Award and Incentive Fees, showing a brief 
historical background of the GAO as well as the stakeholders 
involved.  As additional information, a brief evaluation of 
the requestor and the organizational hierarchy of the GAO 
will show the “close” interrelationship of the requestors 
and the GAO.   
The GAO infers that the Award and Incentive Fee 
mismanagement issue is gargantuan. It cites everything from 
un-enforced policies to inadequate training as contributors 
to the DoD $8 billion dollar mishandling of funds.  To 
establish a basis for the research, the reports will be 
introduced as a background. To understand the GAO reports, 
proper usage of the fees will be reviewed later in the 
research paper with an in-depth analysis of the proper 
usage, definition, and latent issues of Award and Incentive 
Fees.   
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3. Chapter III Contract Award-fees Fees 
 This chapter will be an in-depth investigation of 
Award-fees. The intent is to provide readers with specific 
information regarding the application of the Award-fee, its 
intended use, and then its current misuse in the field of 
acquisition. Using the data from the collection points 
described previously, the researchers will reference and 
cite the proper application of Award-fees.  
Award-fee types contracts are only one of several 
options Contracting Officers have at their disposal to 
motivate contractor performance.  Just as in application, 
this contract must be understood in order to analyze the GAO 
reports and the results of the research survey.  While many 
topics can be discussed concerning Award-fee contracts, this 
chapter will focus only on the cost-plus-award-fee type 
contracts, including the elements of an Award-fee contract, 
evaluation criteria, award procedure, and applications of 
Award-fee type contracts.  
4. Chapter IV Contract Incentive Fees 
This chapter will provide an in-depth background on 
Incentive Fees. The intent is to provide readers with 
specific information regarding the application of Incentive 
Fees, their intended use, and then their current misuse in 
the field of acquisition. Using the data from the collection 
points described previously, the researchers will reference 
and cite areas for Incentive Fees Fee improvements. 
Simply stated, a successful Incentive Fee program 
motivates contractors to heighten performance and achieve 
above-average results in categories of cost, schedule, and 
performance.  It begins with a sound understanding of the 
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industry, a founded risk assessment of the organization, and 
tactful negotiating skills.  The Program Manager and the 
Contracting Officer must hone these intuitive skills in 
order to formulate the right contract mode, at the right 
time, at the right place, in order to fulfill objectives 
critical to the user.  Without these skills, contract 
verbiage is just that, contract verbiage. 
In order for contracts, regardless of their complexity, 
to be a success, it is imperative that the Integrated 
Product Teams (IPT) ensure that members of the DoD program 
have knowledge of the procurement.  Specifically, the 
Program Manager, who has the overall responsibility for 
cost, schedule, and performance, should assume the 
conductor’s role in the initial research effort and maintain 
intimate coordination from the Contracting Officer before 
entering into a contract (GAO, 2007, May 28, pp. 50-53).  
All DoD personnel involved must understand the requirement, 
acquisition strategy, and the right incentives to get 
superior results. 
5. Chapter V Research Findings 
This chapter will focus on the responses from contract 
managers that attended the 45th Annual Aerospace and Defense 
Contract Management Conference in Garden Grove, California 
on the 26 and/or 27 July, 2007.  Each question from the 
surveys labeled “contractor” and “Government” (see 
Appendices C  &D) will be analyzed and charted individually 
or comparatively to compare findings in this text with the 
excerpts that were extracted from the GAO report 06-66 and 
409T.  This analysis will assist the readers in addressing 
ongoing Award and Incentive Fee misuse that continues to 
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plague the DoD credibility in assuring sound business 
judgment and solid procurement activity. This analysis will 
assist the readers in understanding the respondents’ 
(Government & Industry) views relating to the GAO assessment 
of the DoD use of Award and Incentive Fees.  
In addition to the individual analysis, there will be a 
comparative analysis from the responses of similar questions 
from the surveys (See Appendices C and D).  The surveys were 
constructed to have some identical questions.  The purpose 
of this was to identify any disparity in the responses 
between the Government and the contractors. The comparative 
analysis will show any significant correlations between the 
Government and the contractors.  Each section will be 
charted and discussed to outline the findings in a visually 
accessible manner.  
Finally, a summary of this section will be included to 
encompass the findings of the research.   
6. Chapter VI Conclusions, Recommendations, & 
Areas for Further Research 
Chapter VI will provide the readers with a summation of 
the MBA project.  This chapter will encapsulate all of the 
findings and incorporate the researchers’ final assessment 
of the responses from the survey.  The focus will be to 
capture the responses to the sample survey from the NCMA and 
to identify potential future follow-on topics.  The readers 
of this project will be able to assess if the GAO accurately 




In summary, we can concede that many problems lay 
dormant within the DoD acquisition system.  Focused research 
with proper dissemination of newly revealed information can 
assist the DoD in vectoring scarce resources to the 
appropriate mitigation points. The researchers contend that 
by identifying and surveying seasoned contract managers, 
they can assist the DoD in performing this task. This 
chapter discussed the introduction to the research and the 
paper.  The next chapter will give the reader background on 
the GOA, its framework, and the stakeholders potentially 












II. BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to give the readers a 
general background into the history of the GAO, from which 
agency it receives its authority as well as its past and 
present roles in Government oversight. An outline of the GAO 
organizational structure is noted; in brevity, a discussion 
on the stakeholder analysis is included.  This will include 
perspectives into the checks and balances system between the 
GAO, Senate, DoD, and the contractors.  The researchers 
contend that an understanding of the interest behind the 
reports may show an indication of the reluctance to change 
and the complacency in which all stakeholders operate. 
Recent criticisms stemming from DoD audits and 
congressionally mandated inquiries into Award-fee contracts 
have caused Contracting Officers to rethink strategies for 
utilizing Award-fee and Incentive Fee contracts.  Mr. 
Kenneth Krieg, former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)), contends 
that the problem is “gigantic,” referring to inaccurate 
utilization of these Incentive Fees whose purpose is to 
obtain a greater value for potentially greater cost (Rogin, 
2007, March 19). The subjectivity which Award-fees integrate 
into contracts makes them an attractive option for 
Contracting Officers.  Frequently, contract Award-fee board 
members can interpret effort to the fee criteria with 
varying results. When the criterion is not based on tangible 
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cost, schedule, or delivery metrics, there is technically no 
right or wrong answer when determining Award-fees.   
On the other hand, Incentive Fee (IF) contract formula 
calculations are regarded as complicated to derive, due to 
the many variables and weighted averages that can contribute 
to the cost-formula ratio.  Incentive Fees are not difficult 
to implement, but with the administration that the contracts 
require, IF contracts are burdensome.   
With subjectivity on one end of the spectrum, and 
administrative burdens on the other, contract Fee matrices 
are duplicated from one contract to the next; the choice and 
application often results in a prisoner’s dilemma.  For 
instance, Program Managers (PM) have the option of hurdling 
blocks of creativity to formulate a fee that gets results, 
or “borrow” previous arrangements from other contracts.  
Time and multiple levels of approval ultimately serve as a 
contributor to the PM and CO settling for the latter.  The 
result of this is an ineffective and inefficient fee 
program.  
In this conflict between policy, reform, Congress, the 
DoD, industry, JCIDS, and PPBE, there are stakeholders that 
unnoticeably have bargaining power when citing mismanagement 
of taxpayer funds.  We have briefly described the conceptual 
notion of how variant types of fees should operate; however, 
for additional clarification, the researchers will 
investigate Award-fees and Incentive Fees in full detail 
later in the project.  Prior to plummeting into the literary 
review, we will evaluate the stakeholders involved.  This 
may open a labyrinth of questions for exploration in future 
research.  For the purpose of this chapter, we will evaluate 
the Congress and the rationale for inquiry, the GAO’s 
 19
purpose within the organizational structure, its positioning 
for policy, DoD policy and feedback from industry derived 
from the sample survey submitted at the 45th Annual 
Aerospace and Defense Contract Management Conference.  
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 For decades, the United States Government has utilized 
various forms of contract Incentive Fees in an effort to 
motivate contractors to deliver above-satisfactory results 
on cost, schedule, and performance.  Since the promulgation 
of the FAR, the Government has used monetary means to 
incentivize contractors.  There are other methodologies to 
catalyze above-par performance; however, the Government 
chooses to use AF and IF as its primary incentives.  
 Typically, Award-fee contracts emphasize multiple 
aspects of contractor performance in a wide variety of areas 
such as quality, technical ingenuity, cost management, and 
timeliness (GAO, 2005, p. 6).  While these items appear to 
be measurable, one must evaluate the following questions: 
• What is quality?  How is it defined?  How is it 
measured? 
• What is technical ingenuity?  What innovation is it 
compared to? 
• How is cost management measured?  Is it the least spent 
or the best allocation of funding? 
• How is time measured and evaluated?  Is it 
periodically, or just at the end of the contract? 
 Many times, the acquisitioning agency will “hot wash” 
the issue to determine if the criteria were successful.  
Often, the information is not shared or is only disseminated 
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through a “stove-piped” channel within the community.  The 
generated reports are normally declared as internal 
memorandums used for decision-making purposes only.  When 
criteria are subject to speculation, a specialized agency 
intervenes under the guidance of Congress; this agency is 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO}. 
C. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Since its inception, the GAO has been subject to 
appreciation, ridicule, and praise for its reports and 
various types of investigative inquiries. Characterized as 
what many present-day professionals refer to as the 
“watchdog” for Congress with no teeth, the GAO continues to 
highlight ongoing problems and issues that plague the US 
Government and its agencies.  The benefit of the GAO is 
debatable; however, the foundation of its inherent authority 
leaves no doubt of the agency’s legitimacy.  An organization 
that has evolved from performing voucher validation to 
program and budget spending analysis, the GAO has gained 
credibility in the eyes of many over the decades.  
Created by the Budget and Accounting Act (42 Stat. 20) 
in 1921, Congress passed the reform to require the federal 
Government to improve accountability (GAO, 2004). The 
function of auditing, initially the responsibility of the 
treasury, was transferred to the GAO, in addition to 
accounting and claims functions. The Act made the GAO 
independent of the executive branch and gave it a broad 
mandate to investigate how federal funds are spent.  Later 
legislation expanded the GAO's influence, but the Budget and 
Accounting Act continues to serve as the basis for its 
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activities (GAO, 2004). GAO oversight extends to every 
classification of the Government (See Figure 1).  Under the 
legislative branch, encompassed by the wings of Congress, 
the GAO investigates the majority of the sub-components of 
the Government.  Although any Senate committee can obtain 
its services, the Committee on Armed Services uses its fair 
share of the GAO’s resources. This may be due to the 
Committee’s influence on the GAO budgetary process.   
The GAO’s budget requests are submitted through 
Congress for its annual appropriations.  For FY 2008, the 
GAO has submitted its budget to the 110th congress with an 
8.5% increase from FY 07 (GAO, 2007, p. 5).  The GAO 
routinely receives its requested budget amounts. 
 
 
Figure 1.   GAO Organizational Chart (GAO, 2004) 
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Senators J. Ensign of Nevada and J. Akaka of Hawaii 
launched an inquiry into the use and handling of Award and 
Incentive Fees.  Their accusations infer consistent DoD 
misusage.  The DoD contends that there is a need for Award 
and Incentive Fees, even if for satisfactory performance. 
One respondent from the NCMA conference stated, “the DOD 
acquisition process consistently delivers effective weapons 
systems.”  Another anonymous writer suggested, “a few large 
dollar contracts incentivizing narrow areas without regard 
for larger Government cost, schedule, or quality issues, 
skews the evaluation of hundreds of smaller AF contracts 
properly managed and AF applied” (Government survey 4).   
In one report, the GAO recommended that the DoD should 
“ensure that Award-fee structures are motivating excellent 
contractor performance by only paying for above satisfactory 
performance” (GAO, 2005, December, p. 43).  To protect the 
interest of the age-old processes the DoD uses to achieve 
“maximum” results, the DoD responded with the following: 
The purpose of fees should be to motivate 
excellent performance. This should not preclude 
paying Award-fees for satisfactory performance. 
The Department utilizes […] fee contracts when 
the nature of the work performed is such that 
objective costs and performance initiatives are 
not important and linking contractor performances 
of some performance-based Incentive Fees is a 
more attractive alternative. In these situations, 
allowing the contractor to earn a portion of the 
Award-fee for satisfactory performance is fair 
and reasonable. (GAO, 2005, December, p. 43, 
emphasis added) 
Many of the contractors will agree that the comments made by 
the DoD have some plausibility. Though that may be the case, 
one anonymous contractor commented, “Contractors work hard 
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for Award-fees. […] If they are handed out for free then 
someone is not doing their job” (Contractor Survey 21). Many 
contractors find themselves caught in a tug-of-war challenge 
between two principle agents: the DoD and their 
shareholders.  Always willing to entertain the needed 
service of the DoD, contractors insist that services and 
procurement of today are not those of past decades.  The 
technical complexity, time, and funding constraints 
contribute to many ACAT 1D programs being in the “red” prior 
to specifications coming to fruition.   Many surveyed 
contracting managers indicate that there are many problems 
with Award and Incentive Fees, such as the administration 
process and the criteria set forth at initiation. One 
opinion was consistent on both sides: proper monetary 
Incentive Fees can contribute to improved contractor 
performance (See Figure 9).  
 Indicated below are potential remedies the GAO 
suggested to the DoD: 
To strengthen the link between monetary Incentive 
Fees and acquisition outcomes and by extension, 
increases the accountability of DOD programs for 
fees paid and of contractors for results 
achieved, takes the following seven actions.  DOD 
can immediately improve its use of Award-fees on 
all new contracts by,  
(1) Instructing the military services to move 
toward more outcome-based Award-fee criteria that 
are both achievable and promote accountability 
for acquisition outcomes;  
(2) Ensuring that Award-fee structures are 
motivating excellent contractor performance by 
only paying Award-fees for above satisfactory 
performance; and  
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(3) Requiring the appropriate approving officials 
to review new contracts to make sure these 
actions are being taken;  
(4) Issuing DOD guidance on when roll over is 
appropriate;   
(5) Developing a mechanism for capturing Award 
and Incentive Fees-fee data within existing data 
systems, such as the Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval system;  
(6) Developing performance measures to evaluate 
the effectiveness of Award and Incentive Fees as 
a tool for improving contractor performance and 
achieving desired program outcomes; and  
(7) Developing a mechanism to share proven 
Incentive Fees strategies for the acquisition of 
different types of products and services with 
contracting and program officials across DOD. 
(GAO, 2005, p. 4)    
The GAO seeks to find the root cause of the issue 
investigated. Many times, as did the DoD in this 
circumstance, the investigated organization will agree with 
some, all, or none of the findings.  The GAO does not 
explain “how” to obtain a solution to the organization.  The 
solution may solve the problem, or it may contribute to it. 
With its mission completed and the requesting congressman 
satisfied with the findings, the GAO identifies and 
addresses the next issue on the agenda.  Although attention 
has been bought to the problem, and policy and directives 
changed, the question remains: does the GAO convey its 
findings in a way that is acknowledged and accepted by 




Many policies reflect the proper way of using Award and 
Incentive Fees. Yet, managing the overall use of fees will 
take communication, responsiveness, and coordination from 
each organization.  
All of the stakeholders contribute to the inefficient 
bureaucratic system that makes the DoD process unique. The 
constant struggle to prove fault and ineptness continues to 
divide an illusive consensus. Although the DoD, GAO, and 
Congress have checks-and-balances, findings and concurrences 
are conceded with no additional joint effort to solve the 
issue.  
This chapter discussed a brief history of the GAO, its 
role and organizational structure, in addition to the 
stakeholders involved in the reports used in this research.  
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III. CONTRACT AWARD-FEES 
Award-fee contracts must be structured in ways 
that will focus the Government and contractors' 
efforts on meeting or exceeding cost, schedule, 
and performance requirements, according to a 
memorandum for secretaries of the U.S. military 
departments and directors of the defense 
agencies. The ability to earn Award-fees needs to 
be directly linked to achieving desired program 
outcomes. (Finley, 2006, p. 2) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide the reader with a basic 
understanding of Award-fee type contracts, which is only one 
of a Government Contracting Officer’s several options to 
motivate contractor performance.  Within this chapter, the 
Award-fee determination process and Award-fee concepts will 
also be evaluated as they are used in cost-plus-award-fee 
contracts in major weapon systems acquisition within the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and space systems in the 
National Aeronautical Space Administration (NASA).  Both the 
DoD and NASA are encountering similar problems with 
contractor performance and program outcome; therefore, both 
GAO reports (06-409T (2005) and 07-58 (2007, January)) and 
applicable references and sources will be utilized.  While 
many topics could be discussed concerning Award-fee 
contracts, this chapter will focus only on the cost-plus-
award-fee type contracts, including the elements of an 
Award-fee contract, evaluation criteria, award procedure, 
and the applications of AF contracts.  
Today, Government Contracting Officers have become the 
center of attention when topics such as contractor 
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performance Incentive Fees and Award-fees are mentioned.  
What options does a Contracting Officer have to persuade the 
contractor to perform?  Most Government Contracting Officers 
that use Award-fees in their contracts are aware of at least 
two types of contract motivators that also reduce risk—
Incentive Fees and Award-fees.  Award-fees will be analyzed 
in this chapter. 
To motivate contractor performance today, certain 
structures or elements have to be put in place to allow the 
Government and the contractor to work together to achieve 
the desired outcome. Money, profit, and/or a promise for 
additional contracts could be used as optional motivators 
for the contractor to perform above standards or to meet 
delivery schedules early.  The lure of follow-on awards to 
contractors have, in the past, kept some contractors 
performing, even if profit margins are low on the first 
contract award (Summers, 1995, pp. 26-28). In the DoD, the 
purpose for using Award and Incentive Fees is to improve 
performance of the contractor and to achieve desired 
acquisition outcomes for the Government (Dept. of the Air 
Force, p. 6).   
Current Issues 
Within the past three to four years, the GAO completed 
several reports on the DoD lack of efficiency in utilizing 
Award-fees contracts based upon poor structuring of 
Incentive Fees contracts.  In 2005, the GAO reported:  “DOD 
has paid billions in Award and Incentive Fees regardless of 
acquisitions outcomes.” It further commented on the DoD need 
for increased structure and implementation of better Award-
fee contracts to effectively motivate the contractor to 
achieve the desired outcome for the Government.  This 
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attributed to the GAO’s analysis that the DoD awarding a 
significant amount of fees to contractors, regardless of 
where the contractor stood on the performance schedule (GAO, 
2005, December, p. 14). 
In another report, issued in January of 2007 by the GAO 
on NASA Procurements, entitled “Use of Award-fees for 
Achieving Program Outcomes Should Be Improved,” the GAO 
asserted that NASA’s Award-fee programs require the 
improvements listed below: 
• NASA should improve its current use of Award-fees by 
reemphasizing tying Award-fee payments to desired 
outcomes, limiting the number of factors used in 
contractor evaluations as its guidance recommends.  
 
• NASA needs to develop metrics for measuring the 
effectiveness of Award-fees, establish a system for 
collecting data on the use of Award-fee contracts. 
(GAO, 2007, January, p.18) 
 
NASA led the way for Award-fee type contracts when it 
acquisitioned complicated materials and specialized services 
to drive the space program.  Award-fees in developmental 
testing of products such as weapons systems and 
developmental software have proven to be useful if correctly 
utilized to affect contractor performance.  Other services 
on which Award-fee type contracts may have an impact are: 
janitorial, landscaping, maintenance, and similar services 
in which the ability to compensate the contractor for non- 
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quantitative aspects of performance on a subjective basis 
follows sound and ethical business judgment (Synder, 2002, 
p. 7). 
B. PURPOSE OF AWARD-FEES 
Award-fees are instruments used to incentivize the 
contractor to go beyond completing a task to merely 
satisfactory standards.  A contract, in most cases, should 
always result in each party having a mutual understanding of 
the work that will be completed or product to be delivered 
and the type of payment used in exchange for that work or 
product delivered.  However, for some contracts,  the vendor 
is encouraged to conform to above-satisfactory standards.  
If utilized appropriately, Award-fees are a beneficial tool 
to motivate contractors to excel.  The overall goal of using 
Award-fees is to motivate contractor performance in areas 
that are subject to judgmental/qualitative measurement and 
evaluation, such as technical functionality, logistics 
support, cost, and schedule.  An Award-fee provision gives 
the contractors an opportunity to earn additional money 
based upon the Government’s assessment of their performance 
in those critical areas. Should the Government and the 
contractor enter into a contract using an Award-fee 
arrangement, if properly structured, it will motivate the 
contractor to increase performance (Dept. of Air Force, 
2002, p. 6).  
C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
During World Wars I and II, Incentive Fees were 
commonly included in contracts. Navy contracts with 
Bethlehem Steel for shipbuilding in World War I included 
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Incentive Fees for performance and capital investment.  The 
mobilization phases throughout World War II created a bias 
for competitive negotiation because of other more important, 
urgent and compelling issues at that time.  The War 
Production Board‘s Directive stated that formally advertised 
bid procedures were not to be used in war contracts.  
Negotiation was to be used instead (as it was in other 
mobilizations).  Nevertheless, the directive also instituted 
three criteria for contracts: (1) speed of delivery, (2) 
conservation of superior facilities for the more difficult 
items of production, and (3) placing contracts with firms 
requiring the least amount of additional machinery and 
equipment.  This necessity for rapid delivery motivated the 
separate departments of the Army and Navy to create 
innovative contract terms and conditions (Synder, 2001, pp. 
5-6). 
The War department developed an “evaluated-fee” 
contract similar to the Cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) 
construction contracts of World War I; the difference was 
that a portion of the fee would be based on the contractor’s 
performance. Further modifications to contracts’ terms were 
made by the Navy‘s Bureau of Ships—adjusting CPFF contracts 
so that a percentage of the fee was fixed, and the rest was 
awarded as a bonus for achieving cost savings. This contract 
appeared in 1943 in large ship-building programs and some 
ordnance items.
  
These critical changes to the contract 
terms laid the foundation for the Award-fee contract type 
used today (Synder, 2001, pp. 5-6).  
Around that time, the Navy was converting as many of 
its contracts as possible into Incentive Fee contracts.  
However, the initiative received mediocre support from 
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industry because of its inexperience with Government 
contract changes. Production experience was low, so 
contractors had difficulty estimating costs, and Government 
changes and interference often interrupted delivery 
schedules.  Consequently, contractors embraced Incentive 
Fees because they were reluctant to associate profit tied to 
changing goals.  The lesson learned was that Incentive Fees 
contracts can be powerful, but are limited unless utilized 
at the right time and place and under the right 
circumstances.  NASA would successfully reintroduce these 
Incentive Fees twenty years later (Synder, 2001, pp. 5-6).  
The concentration of Government forces in the 1960s led 
to the development of the Award-fee process currently used 
in Government contracting.  Secretary of Defense Robert S. 
McNamara, who served under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 
had a tremendous effect on defense procurement.  McNamara, a 
graduate of Harvard's Graduate School of Business 
Administration and a statistician for the Army Air Corps in 
World War II, was determined to upgrade procurement 
practices with modern management techniques.  He terminated  
cost-based contracts, believing that they encouraged waste 
by not linking profits to outcome.   
During McNamara's term as Secretary of Defense, the 
percentage of military procurement dollars awarded by cost-
plus-fixed-fee contracts fell from 39% in 1960 to 14 % in 
1964. Conversely, fixed-price contracts and fixed-price 
Incentive Fees dollars awarded rose from 45 to 55 % in the 
same period (Cibinic & Nash, 1998). Although NASA is 
credited with creating the Award-fee contract that is common 
today, both NASA and the Navy issued contracts with Award-
fee provisions in 1962.  The Navy awarded a contract which 
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incorporated terms for Award-fees for logistics operations 
support at Kwajalein Island that year.  NASA also awarded an 
Award-fee contract in October 1962 that provided for the 
research and development of a nuclear-powered rocket engine.  
In January 1963, NASA awarded its second contract that 
covered the operation, maintenance, and engineering services 
for the Mercury Manned Space Flight Network.  NASA increased 
from one Incentive Fees contract in 1962, to 34 by 1964. By 
the beginning of 1967, it was managing 200 contracts with 
Incentive Fees (Synder, 2001, p. 7).     
 The Air Force did not award its first Award-fee 
contract until 1964.  However, due to problems with an 
unwritten policy against subjective Incentive Fees, no other 
contracts were awarded until the latter parts of 1969 
(Synder, 2001, p. 7).   
Throughout the 1960s, NASA and the Navy used Award-fee 
contracts to the utmost, whereas the Air Force and Army 
remained reluctant.  The Air Force eventually expanded their 
use in the 1970s, as then Secretary of the Air Force Robert 
C. Seamans, Jr., mandated their use on major programs 
acquisitions such as the B-l and F-15 (Synder, 2001, p. 7). 
 During the 1980s and 1990s, Award-fee contracts began 
to flourish in both the DoD and the Air Force.  Even small-
dollar contracts such as maintenance or other service-type 
contracts eventually utilized Award-fees. In fact, Air 
Education and Training Command (AETC) became one of the 
largest users of Award-fee contracts.  AETC contracts out 
much of it operations to private industry—awarding most, if 
not all, of its aircraft maintenance and many base support 
services conducted at its installations (Synder, 2001, p. 
8).  As use of Award-fee contracts for base-level activities 
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increased, the Air Force tasked the Air Force Logistics 
Management Center (later changed to the Air Force Logistics 
Management Agency (AFLMA)) to create a guide for Award-fee 
contracts. This was later published in 1988 (Cibinic & Nash, 
1998). The spread of this contract type among base-level 
offices and program offices has caused the AFLMA and the Air 
Force audit agencies to do repeated reviews of 
implementation throughout the last 10 years.  It is apparent 
that Award-fee use has expanded substantially among Air 
Force contracting agencies. 
D. INNOVATIONS IN AWARD-FEE  
The award-term contract is the newest incentive 
structure in Government contracting.  Thomas Luedtke, NASA’s 
associate administrator for procurement, argued that Award-
term contracting is the most innovative approach in use in 
2000 (Synder, 2001, p. 8-9).   As is the case with so many 
of today’s acquisition reforms, award-term contracting is 
the result of commercial best business practices.  Private 
firms seek long-term business relations with the vendors 
they choose.  The vendor’s performance greatly affects both 
their relationship and the next contract.  In Government 
contracting, award-term contracting offers a similar 
approach (Synder, 2001, p. 7).  As described in the Air 
Force Award-fee Guide (2002), the Government team members 
monitor and evaluate the contractor‘s performance and report 
their findings to a Government Fee Determining Official 
(FDO).  The FDO makes the final determination on the amount 
of award-fee the contractor receives based on their 
evaluation of the contractor’s performance (Dept. of the Air 
Force, 2002, p. 13). If a contractor’s performance is 
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continually rated as excellent by its evaluators, the firm 
could potentially increase a contract length by as much as 
five or more years on an existing five-year contract, 
excluding competition.  This option to extend is a 
unilateral right of the Government, not the contractor 
(Burman, 2000, October 1).    
Award-term contracts reward the contractor with a 
contract extension. In past years, agencies have used award-
term Incentive Fees to acquire a variety of services, 
including technical and logistics support, laundry and dry 
cleaning, depot-level maintenance, aircraft maintenance, 
grounds maintenance, janitorial services, real property 
maintenance and repair, and training(Gill, 2000, September, 
pp. 19-20).  
 
The Incentive Fees is being used with several 
contractual configurations such as fixed-price, cost-
reimbursement, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity, and 
requirements.  
E. ELEMENTS OF A COST-PLUS-AWARD-FEE (CPAF) CONTRACT 
A CPAF contract normally included the following 
components: estimated cost, base fee, maximum fee, award 
periods, and evaluation criteria.  The expected costs must 
be negotiated on a fair and reasonable basis between the 
buyer and the seller, and should represent the best estimate 
of what actual costs will be upon completion of performance.  
Projected costs can be similar to target costs in the Cost-
plus-incentive-fees-fee (CPIF) contract (Venable, 2000, p. 
25). 
The CPAF is related to cost-reimbursable contracts with 
special fee provisions. CPAF contracts are distinguished by 
the distinctive process in which the sum of the contractor's 
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fee is agreed upon.  In a general sense, the Award-fee is a 
motivator that can be paid by the Government to a 
contractor. The intent of the Award-fee contract is “to 
retain control over most or all of the contract’s potential 
profits as leverage. On CPAF contracts, the Award-fee is 
often the only source of potential fee for the contractor 
(GAO, 2007, January p. 4). This control should motivate the 
contractor to exceed the minimum standards of performance 
that are acceptable under the evaluation criteria written 
into the contract.  
The fee traditionally used in a CPAF contract consists 
of two parts.  The first part is a base (or fixed) fee.  
Award-fee guidelines enable the contractor to obtain a base 
fee, which does not change with contract performance.  The 
amount of the base fee will be further explained later in 
this chapter. 
An Award-fee contract also presents a maximum fee.  The 
distinction between the maximum fee and base can be referred 
to as the "Award-fee pool."  The Award-fee pool is applied 
to encourage the contractor to perform excellent work 
(Schade, 1990, December, p. 19). The amount awarded to the 
contractor is dependent on the level of contractor 
performance during the performance period. This award amount 
is intended to provide motivation for the contractor to 
surpass performance standards—for example, quality, 
timeliness, creativity, and cost efficiency.  The Award-fee 
amount given to the contractor may be the entire Award-fee 
pool or only a part of what is available for the period of 
the contract.  The exact amount is based upon a subjective 
evaluation of the quality of the contractor's performance, 
judged based on criteria originally included in the 
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contract.  Government representatives recommend the Award-
fee to the FDO for a unilateral decision (NASA, 2001, Sec 
2.3).  
 The base fee is a fixed fee established by the 
Government after awarding the contract.  The base fee can be 
defined as what is paid to the contractor regardless of the 
contractor’s performance on the contract, as long as the 
contract is still in place or not terminated.  On Government 
cost-reimbursement type contracts the actual payment of a 
base fee typically accompanies a contractor’s monthly 
reimbursement “by the Government” for “best efforts” of 
actual contractor costs (Garrett, 2007a, p. 12).   
The base fee is also the lowest dollar amount of fee 
that a contractor can earn on a CPAF contract. A contract 
may, in fact, have a Zero-base-fee (ZBF). Unallowable Cost 
Offsets (UCO) and Marginal-performance-level (MPL) concepts 
were identified by Gregory Garrett to determine a more 
accurate base fee (Garrett, 2007a, p. 12).  
The ZBF concept deals with the theory that removing a 
base fee and leaving a total fee pool depends only on the 
Award-fee.  This concept can enable better Incentive Fees 
for the contractor to attain performance because if no base 
fee exists, the government no longer guarantees the 
contractor  a base payment regardless of contractor 
performance.  The UCO concept covers the contractor, on an 
average, two to three percent above the contract cost to 
protect the contractor from Government-deemed “Unallowable 
Cost,” which is based on Government cost and accounting 
standards (Garrett, 2007a, pp. 12-13).   
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The MPL concept bares the idea that the base fee 
is established with a particular quality or level 
of performance in mind.  Bases are established by 
taking into consideration the various profit 
analysis factors, but in an amount commensurate 
with that level of quality of performance 
categorized as minimum acceptable.  The MPL 
concept, to determine the amount of base fee, has 
been used by NASA and other Government agencies 
and activities for nearly 30 years. This concept 
contains no percent limits to the amount of base 
fee. (Garrett, 2007a, p. 13) 
Base fees are intended to offer the contractor a 
sufficient fee for completing the bare minimum standards.  
As such, the base fee is the same with the minimum fee on 
the CPIF contract.  However, the DoD supplement to the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) limits the amount of 
the base fee to three percent of the estimated cost (NASA, 
2007, Sec. 1816.405-271(a)).          
As previously discussed, the Award-fee pool is the 
amount of money that is negotiated between the Government 
and the contractor based on performance.  The base fee, 
which is also negotiated, is fixed, not being affected by 
the performance of the contractor.  Finally, maximum fee is 
the total amount of fees that the contractor could receive 
based on excellent or superior performance. It would be a 
combination of the base fee and the Award-fee pool.  
Normally, the Award-fee pool is divided into periods for 
evaluation of contractor performance. 
 The length of the award period must be long enough to 
cover adequate work—so as to allow a logical basis upon 
which to develop the evaluation—but short enough to allow 
feedback to the contractor before the project is completed.  
A three-month or less evaluation period may not be 
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sufficient to justify, based on the amount of work required 
to complete the evaluations.  An evaluation period greater 
than three months in length is more appropriate (Venable, 
2000, p. 26).    
F. CREATING EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Evaluation criteria can be defined as the subjective 
and/or objective criteria that are used to rate each 
category of performance. The criteria must focus on the most 
critical portions of the program and encourage the 
contractor to boost performance. The focal point or end 
result of the program must be spelled in “plain English” to 
the contractor.   The criteria should be clearly defined and 
should detail the program requirements (Dept. of the Air 
Force, 2002, p. 4). 
One of the first and most important steps in the Award-
fee planning process is developing the evaluation criteria 
and standards for making the final award.  The evaluation 
criteria establish the elements of the contractor’s 
performance, which are used by the Government in determining 
the award amount, and which can prove to be very difficult 
to create.  The most significant issues with a CPAF contract 
deal with the quality of the evaluation criteria structure 
and the rating plan.  The impact of a precise, well-written 
evaluation plan cannot be overstated.  The evaluation 
criteria must recognize the weighting of each factor and 
contain guidelines as to the level of performance required 
for specific rating levels (NASA, 2007, FAR Supplement).    
  The contractor must be fully cognizant of the 
evaluation criteria. And, in most agencies, the selection of 
criteria is not a subject of negotiation.  The final 
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selection is a unilateral decision by the Government.  The 
main benefit of this authority is so that the Government can 
change the evaluation criteria during the contract if the 
Government deems it necessary to refocus the contractor’s 
efforts (NASA, 2001, Sec 3.4.1).  Overall, the evaluation 
criteria should emphasize the most important aspects of the 
program (as these will likely motivate the contractors in a 
positive way to improve performance) and should be specific 
to the needs and goals of the acquisition (Dept. of the Air 
Force, 2002, p. 27).   
 No two evaluations and rating plans will be the same in 
all respects; each must be modified to fulfill its own 
specific requirement. Furthermore, the evaluation criteria 
should be tailored to a restricted number of significant 
elements critical to the project’s successful completion.  A 
few examples of key elements used include technical 
functionality, quality, managerial capability, schedule 
adherence, cost control, and personnel utilization.  Once 
the key elements are decided upon, these categories may be 
further divided into sub-criteria for evaluating the 
elements that make up each performance category (Wight, 
1984, p. 28). 
Because the Government is more concerned with results 
rather than effort, the evaluation criteria needs to assess 
“output and/or outcome” rather than “input” (Wight, 1984, p. 
28). However; based upon the procurement circumstances, 
performance evaluation factors could have outcomes, outputs, 
inputs or a mix.  The evaluation of the results of an 
activity as compared to its intended purpose is the outcome 
factor. Outcome-based factors are the least problematic when 
one is administering performance evaluation factors, and 
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should offer the best gauge for overall success.  Therefore, 
outcome-based factors should be the primary type of 
evaluation factor considered for use. The output factor 
refers to the processes, procedures, actions, and key 
elements influencing successful contract performance. Input 
factors refer to the immediate processes, procedures, 
actions or techniques that influence successful contract 
performance (NASA, 2007, FAR Supplement).  As such, the 
evaluated criteria must clearly indicate all objectives in 
order to reach the optimal outcome; otherwise, the overall 
Incentive Fees to the contractor may be lost. 
There are numerous ways to institute a rating plan in 
the evaluation criteria.  As indicated previously, no two 
systems are alike; a system must be selected that fits the 
requirement. The system of principles most commonly referred 
to as the adjective-type standard grading system indexes 
performance, quality, adjective and corresponding 
explanations to a percentage of the potential Award-fee 
available during the evaluation period (NASA, 2001, Sec. 
3.4.1)  Appendix A shows an example of an adjective 
evaluation standards system recommended by the NASA Award-
fee Contracting Guide.  
G. THE AWARD PROCEDURE 
The award procedure can be broken down into a three-
phase process in most contracting arenas: evaluation of 
contractor performance, review of contractor performance, 
and determination of Award-fee by the FDO.  
The first phase begins with the Government evaluation 
of the contractor’s performance during the Award-fee or 
reporting period. In most cases, the individuals evaluating 
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the contractor are those that have the technical and 
business expertise in what the contractor has been 
contracted to accomplish during that period.  These people 
may include the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO), 
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) auditor, and other on-
site representatives. These evaluators must understand the 
contract terms and conditions, the evaluation criteria, and 
the technical areas.  The fundamental objective in this part 
of the process (during the contractor’s evaluation of 
performance) is to have an government expert or the most 
experienced government personnel evaluate that particular 
portion of the contract in which they are proficient. The 
Government expert’s evaluation is then presented in the form 
of a report to the appointed evaluation board members know 
as the Performance Evaluation Board (PEB). The exact number 
of reports is based on the number of evaluation periods 
established in the contract at the beginning of contract 
award in most cases, but are commonly monthly or quarterly. 
(Wight, 1984, p.31) 
The next phase, phase two, is the review of the 
evaluations completed by the PEB.  If the PEB were to become 
engaged in this process, its responsibility would be to 
analyze all of the evaluation reports and subjectively 
decide a performance rating for each pre-established 
evaluation criteria and an overall performance rating for 
the period for the contractor (Wight, 1984, pp. 31-32). 
The third phase is the actual award by the Fee 
Determination Official (FDO).  If the PEB is employed, it 
forwards the performance rating and recommended Award-fee 
amount to the FDO. The FDO then reviews the recommendation 
of the PEB, with the option to agree or disagree with the 
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recommendations and Award-fee amount. If a PEB does not 
assist the FDO, then the FDO must review the evaluation 
reports and determine an Award-fee amount. In major 
contracts, the FDO would be at the management level of the 
procuring activity (usually the Project Manager), while in 
smaller contracts, the Contracting Officer might carry out 
this function.  After the FDO initial award determination is 
complete, a letter report is forwarded to the contractor 
explaining the performance grade and corresponding Award-
fee, and including a list of all areas of performance 
improvement which, if incorporated, may result in potential 
additional Award-fees in future periods (Wight, 1984, pp. 
32-33).  The contractor has an opportunity to refute the FDO 
decision by presenting evidence in his favor to qualify the 
actions taken.  However, once the FDO (possibly in 
consultation with the PEB) has reviewed the rebuttal and 
final Award-fee determination, the judgment is final and not 
subject to any further disputes by the contractor (Dept. of 
the Air Force, 2002, p. 13). (See Appendix B for an example 
of a Determination letter.) 
1. NASA Evaluation of Awards-fee Contracts  
When working with CPAF contracts, NASA personnel 
complete semiannual evaluations analyzing contractor 
performance and comparing it with the criteria specified in 
the contract.  Throughout each period of evaluation, the 
contractor’s performance is tracked and reported to the 
performance evaluation board (PEB).  The PEB then continues 
to prepare the performance report forwarded to them with 
other important information and then forwards their 
information to the fee determination official (FDO), stating 
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their findings and recommendations for consideration. The 
contractor also has the option to submit its own self-
assessment of its performance throughout the evaluation 
period.  The FDO may meet with the PEB in review of the 
report. Thereafter, a final decision is made in writing as 
to the amount of fees to be paid.  The FDO provides the 
determination to the Contracting Officer and a copy of the 
related document to the contractor (Dept. of the Air Force, 
2002, pp. 13-16). 
H. THE APPLICATION OF AWARD-FEES 
For the Government to achieve the maximum benefits from 
the Award-fee process and its superior motivational 
elements, additional focus should be placed in the reduction 
of the administrative burden.  However, in certain contract 
types, such as cost-reimbursement contracts, the Government 
should be already engaged in the majority of these actions. 
The Government should have a clear understanding of what 
truly motivates contractors to perform above-standard on 
contracts and use that information to leverage the desired 
outcome.  The theory behind Award-fee contracts is to 
maintain authority over most, if not all, of the 
contractor’s prospective profit as leverage (GAO, 2007, 
January, p. 4). 
If a cost-plus-award-fee type contract is utilized 
properly, management is given a flexible tool that entices 
the contractors to enhance their performance.  This type of 
contract is mainly suitable for support services that are 
usually associated with base maintenance and operations 
support contracts (Ault & Handy, 1986, May).   
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Cost-plus-award-fee contracts are appropriately used for:  
• Work to be performed is such that it is neither 
feasible nor effective to devise predetermined 
objective Incentive Fees targets applicable to cost, 
technical performance, or schedule. 
• The likelihood of meeting acquisition objectives will 
be enhanced by using a contract that effectively 
motivates the contractor toward exceptional performance 
and provides the Government with the flexibility to 
evaluate both actual performance and conditions under 
which it was achieved; and 
• Any additional administrative effort and cost required 
to monitor and evaluate performance are justified by 
the expected benefits. (FAR,2007, Sec 16.405-2(b)1)  
CPAF contracts are especially useful in the procurement 
of support services associated base maintenance activities 
and the high-tech program adopted by NASA. Cost-plus-award-
fee contracts are not used:  
• As an administrative technique to avoid Cost-plus-
fixed-fee contracts when the criteria for Cost-plus-
fixed-fee contracts apply, nor shall a Cost-plus-award-
fee contract be used to avoid the effort of 
establishing objective targets so as to make feasible 
use of a Cost-plus-incentive-fees type contract.   
• Where the contract amount, period of performance or the 
benefits expected are insufficient to warrant 
additional administrative effort or cost. (NASA, 2001, 
Sec. 1.3)  
While no regulations have designated a specific size 
and type of contract that must be in the form of CPAF, it is 
 46
the researchers’ opinion that the Government should not 
enter into a CPAF contract when the benefits of doing so do 
not outweigh the costs.  
If used properly in DoD procurements and acquisitions, 
Award-fee could be advantageous to both the Government and 
the contractor. Contractors that have outstanding 
performance receive the larger reward or fee based on the 
perspective of the Government, and the Government receives a 
product or service that meets or exceeds performance 
standards.  The Award-fee, if used appropriately, can be an 
element of flexibility enabling the Government to take 
control of the contract in each award period. The DoD’s 
addition of Award-fees creates tools that can potentially 
enhance the performance of the contractor (Burt, Dobler & 
Starling, 2003, p. 447.) 
I. SUMMARY 
In summary, an Award-fee, in DoD contracting, is money 
set aside by the Government to persuade the contractor to 
perform exceptionally—for a specified time based on the 
performance outcome stated in the contract.  The main 
distinction among Award-fees and other fees is that unlike 
the base fee, the contractors’ Award-fee is dependent on the 
Government’s subjective evaluation of the contractor’s 
performance. The subjective aspect provides flexibility in 
contracting situations in uncertain environments.   
The objective of this chapter was to provide the 
readers the necessary material needed to understand the uses 
of Award-fee type contracts by clarifying cost-plus-award-
fee contracts, variable contract elements, the award 
procedure, and the applications of Award-fee type contracts. 
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This next chapter will be a comprehensive overview of the 

























IV. CONTRACT INCENTIVE FEES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter will explain the principles and 
applications of Incentive Fee (IF) contracts.  These 
contracts are used to obtain greater performance from 
contractors on Government procurements.  In addition to 
reviewing the generalities of IF contracts, the researchers 
will discuss the objectives of the incentives and how to 
incorporate them into effective contract terminology.   
A successful IF contract requires a top-notch, experienced 
Contracting Officer. This officer must have the knowledge 
base to derive meaningful Incentive Fees that motivate 
contractors to aspire to perform and achieve above-average 
results in categories of cost, schedule, and performance 
(”Negotiating,” 2005, August, pp. 50-53). The principle 
understanding is initiated with a sound understanding of the 
industry, a founded risk assessment of the organization, and 
tactful negotiating skills.  Evaluating the result of the 
programs, many times the Contracting Officer can discover 
that the incentive parameters are positively related to the 
return (Golec, 1993, November, p.1396). To manage 
effectively, the Program Manager and the Contracting Officer 
must hone these intuitive skills in order to formulate the 
right contract mode, at the right time, at the right place 
in order to fulfill objectives critical to the user.   
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B. OBJECTIVES 
There are many variations of Incentive Fees. IF 
contracts use what is considered an objective evaluation of 
the contractors’ performance to adjust the fee paid (GAO, 
2005, December, p. 8). They allow for the Government and 
contractors to provide needed flexibility in acquiring a 
large variety and volume of supplies and services required 
by agencies (FAR, 16.401).  Various IF contracts and the 
fashion in which they are written can subject either of the 
parties in the contract to a greater associated risk.  In 
the case of IF contracts, both the contractor’s 
responsibility for performance as well as the cost of the 
contract for profit or incentives offered are tailored to 
the uncertainties involved in contract performance (FAR, 
16.401). 
The criteria is conveyed either subjectively or 
objectively, depending on the standards of measurement that 
the Program Manager and the Contracting Officer deem 
appropriate. The FAR describes IF contracts as: 
appropriate when a firm-fixed price contract is 
not appropriate and the required supplies or 
services can be acquired at a lower cost and in 
certain instances, with improved delivery of 
technical performance, by relating the amount of 
profit or fee payable under the contract to the 
contractors’ performance. (FAR, 16.401)   
IF contracts, by definition, require the Contracting 
Officer to write incentives that are measurable to encourage 
improvements in the contract that may have been otherwise 
unattainable by using traditional Firm-fixed contracting 
vehicles.  The objective of IF-based contracts is threefold: 
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a) To establish reasonable and attainable targets 
that clearly communicate to the contractor; 
b) To include Incentive Fees arrangements designed to 
motivate the contractor that might not otherwise 
be emphasized and also discourage waste; 
c) To ensure that when using predetermined formula 
types, evaluated contract outcome is commensurate 
with performance. (FAR, 16.401) 
Information obtained from various sources and factors 
driven by the customers needs both equate to risk and the 
amount of risk that the Program Manager and/or the 
Contracting Officer is willing to accept on the acquisition.  
The type of analysis the Contracting Officer or PM uses when 
choosing and evaluating will indeed vary depending upon the 
circumstance of the contract. However, the results are 
weighted accordingly to produce the best applicable result.  
In order to align these factors, some consideration should 
be given for contractor aspirations.   
Depending on the stakeholders IF factors will vary.  
While many differ from organization to organization, many 
are and have remained the same for decades.  Some items that 
are important to companies are company growth, increased 
share of the defense market, public image, organizational 
prestige, carry-over benefits to commercial business, 
opportunities for follow-on business, and greater 
expectations for future growth and profit (Fox, 1974, p. 
441).  The dilemmas for many Contracting Officers involve 
how to arrange the contract in a way that provides the 
contractor the opportunity to accomplish these goals.  
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C. IMPLEMENTATION 
IF contracts usually focus on cost control, although 
they can be used to motivate contractors to achieve specific 
delivery targets or performance goals in tangible areas such 
as range, speed, engine thrust, aircraft speed, and/or 
maneuverability, just to name a few, when dealing with major 
defense procurements (GAO, 2005, p. 6). IF are considered 
objective in nature, such that the criteria for deciphering 
the methodology normally involves one simplistic step 
followed by one of three evaluations: 
1. The first basic step involves the Contracting Officer 
comparing the contractor’s actual cost to target costs 
specified.  Upon completion: 
a. If contractor actual costs match the target cost, 
the DoD awards the contractor an amount called the 
target fee or target profit. 
b. If contractor actual cost falls below the target 
costs, the Contracting Officer applies a formula 
with a share ratio that specifies how much the 
contractor’s target fee or profit is increased for 
every dollar the actual cost is below the target 
costs. 
c. If contractor actual cost exceeds the target cost, 
the Contracting Officer applies a formula with a 
share ratio that specifies how much the 
contractor’s target fee or profit is reduced for 
every dollar that actual cost is above the target 



















Figure 2.   Distribution of Award and Incentive Fees 
Contracts, FY 1999-2003 (GAO, 2005, p. 10)   
 
Although the application of this formula appears to be 
relatively simplistic, it frequently involves the 
contribution of other variables that may dictate the 
outcome.  In the DoD, professionals themselves have 
continued to exclaim that cost, delivery, and technical IF 
in certain acquisitions have a direct correlation to 
contractor performance; they are confident the application 
of IF is beneficial.  This opinion, however, is 
contradictory to the information of the aforementioned 
recent congressionally mandated reports. The reports were 
short of citing Government contributions relating to 
Government delays, but were confident in distinguishing the 
consistent negligence of the DoD on fee application.  Due to 
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the impact of the reports and their apparent circulation, 
program officials may consider rethinking their strategy and 
eliminate some IF structures in the future (GAO, 2005, p. 
29).    
It has been suggested that the present system of 
rewards and penalties in defense procurement discourages 
cost control and cost reduction (Fox, 1974, p. 439).  
Varying research attempts to rationalize the many reasons 
for this finding. Yet, one thing is clear: often the notion 
of “patriotism” is no longer an incentive. Competition, 
scarce resources, and time are all factors that deliberately 
place the contractor in positions in which presenting 
unrealistic proposals “covering cost” is the unwritten 
industry rule.   
The only thing worse than a serious cost overrun, is a 
cost under-run of 15% or more (Fox, 1974, p. 440).    
Although each contract is determined to be evaluated 
“separately,” when a contractor exceeds projected 
established criteria, it sets precedence, regardless of 
where gains were attained.  
For instance, if, in fact, a typical base operational 
budget were to reduce cost by 10% in an average fiscal year, 
there would normally be “justified” reallocation of those 
fund elsewhere to fulfill other requirements.  The intent of 
the base is to spend all of the remaining funds locally.  
The reason why is simple: if the funds were to be returned, 
the budget for next year would likely be approximately 10% 
less than the previous year.  In essence, there is no 
incentive to save, other than the greater good.  Contractors 
respond the same way with their budget as do base 
commanders. Consequently, future contracts are viewed in 
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respect to the cost savings from the previous contract 
award. To put it plainly, if such an under-run occurred, 
this would, in turn, endanger the vendor’s relationship with 
the Contracting Officer and motivate the latter to negotiate 
lower target pricing on the next contract (Fox, 1974, p. 
440).  
Another insightful approach to an already controversial 
issue is that of NASA’s top procurement official, Tom 
Luedtke. He ventured to rediscover the age-old technique of 
incentivizing contractors by developing a way to add 
performance Incentive Fees to contracts without paying high 
fees (Palmer, 2005, August, p. 22).     
Attempting to cater to the frustrations of industry 
managers, the NASA began to experiment with another type of 
incentive, award term contracts, in an effort to reward 
companies for their excellent performance by extending their 
contracts instead of paying them more money (Palmer, 2005, 
August, p. 22). In an effort to find a win-win situation 
that would allow the Government to have another form of 
leverage for incentivizing contractors while still 
maintaining above-satisfactory degrees of cost, schedule, 
and performance, Luedtke discovered that extensions in the 
contract were more appealing to industry than the notion of 
just a fee (Palmer, 2005, August, p. 22).     
Three years ago, John Sutton, Deputy Director of 
Contracting at the Air Force's Arnold Engineering 
Development Center in Tennessee, awarded a $2.7 billion 
contract for the center's operations that could extend up to 
12 years. Using the award-term incentive, he saved millions 
of dollars by avoiding annual competitions (Palmer, 2005, 
August, p. 22).    
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As with many contracts, the most critical element is to 
ensure that incentive metrics are properly aligned. Poorly 
designed or insufficient measures may result in unintended 
consequences.  For example, one company tried to motivate 
data entry operators by paying a bonus for more than a 
certain number of keystrokes per hour. The operators soon 
learned they could "increase productivity" by repeatedly 
tapping a single key (Perkins, 2004, May 10). Evidently some 
metrics are seemingly clear to some, but are openly 
ambiguous to others.   
D. ELEMENTS OF INCENTIVE FEES  
There are many forms of contracting incentives.  They 
can be arranged in various ways within the contract to 
deliver the desired result. They stem from any of the three 
primary functions of the PM—that is, to incentivize for 
cost, schedule, and performance. If the desired outcome is 
tiered, then it may be optimal for the CO (in coordination 
with the PM) to organize an incentive for multiple aspects 
of the contract. 
There are multiple ways that an IF contract can be 
structured.  The modes in which it is implemented will vary 
based on the degrees of risk assessed in the procurement.  
Modes range from Firm-fixed-pricing (FFP) to Cost-plus (CP) 
type contracts. The following factors should be included to 
justify the correct contractual instrument for the 
procurement (FAR, 16.104): 
Price competition is defined as an effective 
price competition, which results in realistic 
pricing. A fixed-price contract is ordinarily in 
the Government’s interest. 
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Price analysis, with or without competition, may 
provide a basis for selecting the contract type.  
The degree to which price analysis can provide a 
realistic pricing standard should be carefully 
considered.  
Cost analysis can be used in the absence of 
effective price competition. If price analysis is 
not sufficient, the cost estimates of the offeror 
and the Government provide the basis for 
negotiating contract-pricing arrangements. It is 
essential that the uncertainties involved in 
performance and their possible impact upon costs 
be identified and evaluated, so a contract type 
that places a reasonable degree of cost 
responsibility upon the contractor can be 
negotiated.  
Type and complexity of the requirements, 
particularly those unique to the Government, 
usually result in greater risk assumption by the 
Government. This is especially true for complex 
research-and-development contracts, in which 
performance uncertainties or the likelihood of 
changes make estimating performance costs in 
advance difficult. As a requirement occurs, cost 
risk should shift to the contractor, and a fixed-
price contract should be considered.  
Urgency of the requirement is deemed as a primary 
factor. The Government may choose to assume a 
greater proportion of risk, or it may offer 
Incentive Fees to ensure timely contract 
performance.  
Period of performance or length of production run 
can be evaluated in times of economic 
uncertainty; contracts extending over a 
relatively long period may require economic 
price-adjustment terms.  
Contractor’s technical capability and financial 
responsibility.  
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Adequacy of the contractor’s accounting system 
should be reviewed before a Contracting Officer 
agrees on a contract type other than firm-fixed-
price. The Contracting Officer shall ensure that 
the contractor’s accounting system will permit 
timely development of all necessary cost data in 
the form required by the proposed contract type.  
This factor may be critical when the contract 
type requires price revision while performance is 
in progress, or when a cost-reimbursement 
contract is being considered, and all current or 
past experience with the contractor has been on a 
fixed-price basis.  
Concurrent contracts. If performance under the 
proposed contract involves concurrent operations 
under other contracts, the impact of those 
contracts, including their pricing arrangements, 
should be considered.  
Extent and nature of proposed subcontracting. If 
the contractor proposes extensive subcontracting, 
a contract type reflecting the actual risks to 
the prime contractor should be selected.  
Acquisition history. Contractor risk usually 
decreases as the requirement is repeatedly 
produced.  In addition, product descriptions or 
descriptions of services to be performed can be 
defined more clearly.  (FAR, 16.104)  
According to the FAR, these are the most common 
categorical areas into which contract requirements can be 
segmented.  Although there maybe others, COs have learned to 
used these areas in contract determination. 
E. ESTABLISHING INCENTIVE FEES CRITERION 
There are two distinct categories in which contract IF 
criterion is based: subjectivity and objectivity.  Both 
classifications of contract Incentive Fees are typically 
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categorized as either positive Incentive Fees or negative 
Incentive Fees or some combination thereof (Garrett, 1997, 
p. 95). 
Subjectively based contract Incentive Fees are those 
that use individual judgment, opinions, and informed 
impressions as the basis for determining the amount of 
Incentive Fees, either positive or negative, awarded in 
designated areas (Garrett, 1997, p. 95). The key to 
subjective IF is ultimately determined by one or more 
individuals making a decision based upon his/her experience, 
knowledge, and the available information—a total judgment 
(Garrett, 1997, p. 95). 
In contrast, objective Incentive Fees can be 
identified, based, and evaluated, on facts and or actual 
events.  Objective fees are commonly applied to Incentive 
Fees contracts seeking to improve cost, schedule, and 
performance. The next section on implementation will 
describe and reference examples of how quantitative 
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Fees 
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Figure 3.   Incentive Fees Matrices (Garrett, 1997, p. 97) 
F. PROCEDURE FOR IMPLEMENTING 
1. Incentive Fees Based on Cost Performance 
  Cost is the most sought-after performance variable.  
The procedures for Incentive Fees based on cost-performance 
contracts are as follows:  
The parties negotiate a target cost and a target 
profit (which equals the target price) and the 
sharing formula that will be applied to cost 
over- and under-runs. 
 A sharing formula is negotiated for cost over-
runs and under-runs. 
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Lastly, a ceiling price is negotiated, normally 
referred to as the Point of Total Assumption 
(PTA) that is normally the DoD maximum dollar 
liability.  (Garrett, 1997, p. 96) 
Gregory Garrett’s scenario that follows illustrates the 
correct application of an Incentive Fee structure. 
 
Scenario 1: 
Target cost: $20,000,000 
Target Profit: $2,000,000 
Target Price: $22,000,000 
Sharing Formula: 75/25 Over-run (buyer 75% and the seller at 
25%), 50%/50% under-run 
Ceiling price: $24,500,000 (122.5 of target cost) 
In a given procurement for armored personnel carriers, 
the work amounted to an actual cost of $21M dollars, 
respectively over-running the target cost by $1M.  The 
contractor’s share of the overrun is 25%, which is $500K.  
The target profit is then consequently reduced by the amount 
of the contractor’s share.  At the end of the project, the 
contractor would receive the $21M in cost performance plus 
an earned profit of $1.5M.  The DoD then reaps the benefit 
of the total cost of the project being $22.5M, a total of 
$2M below the ceiling price.  The $750K represents the DoD 
75% of the cost overrun (Garrett, 1997, p. 96). As the cost 
of the project increases, there is reverse correlation in 
the profit. 
 In this particular scenario, the question begs to be 
asked, “Do these ratios apply regardless of the cost?”  The 




arrangements shifts to essentially a 0/100 share ratio.  
Mathematically, the PTA is described as the following 
formula: 
PTA= Pr argCeiling ice TargetPrice T etCost
BuyerShareRatio
⎧ ⎫− +⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭  
Equation 1. PTA Equation 
(Garrett, 1997, p. 96) 
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Figure 4.   Share Ratio 
(Garrett, 1997, p. 96) 
 
Scenario 2: 
Using the same scenario, let us assume that the 







the scenario, the costs saved by the contractor have a 
greater benefit to both parties.  Let us assume that the 
under-run is $1M. Consequently, as described earlier, the 
contractors share is 50% or $500K.  The total cost that the 
contractor would be entitled to is $500K plus the $2M in 
target profit in addition to the $19M in actual costs.  This 
cumulatively brings the total to $21.5M.  The contractor in 
this scenario enjoys greater profit, while the buyer enjoys 
savings as well.  The buyer’s 50% is reflected by the $21.5M 
cost, which is $500K under the target price (Garrett, 1997, 
p. 96). Although there appears to be only one benefactor in 
this entire scenario, the contractor accumulates a greater 
profit by savings in cost, vice just having his cost covered 
in the overage scenario. 
2. Incentive Fees Based on Schedule or Delivery 
Performance 
In DoD procurement, the Government often wants things 
to happen “yesterday.”  We often motivate contractors with 
negative incentives for late delivery, such as liquidated 
damages.  The FAR states that liquidated damages are not 
punitive and are not negative performance Incentive Fees; 
however, frequently this is how they are viewed (FAR, pp. 
11-501). The purpose of liquidated damages is to compensate 
the Government for probable damages. Therefore, the 
liquidated damages rate must be a reasonable forecast of 
just compensation for the harm caused by late delivery or 
untimely performance of the particular contract. The CO 
should use a maximum amount or a maximum period for 
assessing liquidated damages, if these limits reflect the 
maximum probable damage to the Government (FAR, p. 11-501).   
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It is essential that Contracting Officers use good 
judgment when applying liquidated damages.  They must 
consider the potential impact on both pricing competition 
and contract administration (FAR,, p. 11-501).   Mainly, 
liquidated damages are used when the time of delivery or 
timely performance is so important that the Government may 
reasonably expect to suffer damage if the delivery or 
performance is delinquent; and the extent or amount of such 
damage would be difficult or impossible to either estimate 
accurately or prove (FAR, p. 11-501).  Negative incentives 
such as liquidated damages are only one type incentive used 
to improve performance; positive incentives can be used to 
facilitate work as well.   
A best practice for contracts is to seek positive 
Incentive Fees for early delivery and early schedule 
performance. One such example of successful incentives was a 
recent urgent need due to a devastating event affecting the 
livelihood of an entire metropolitan area.  A portion of the 
I-580 Bridge in Oakland, CA, melted due to a gasoline tanker 
exploding into one of the support beams.   
The California Department of Transportation (CALTRANS) 
was in dire need of a qualified contractor to quickly and 
inexpensively perform the restoration work. Thus, CALTRANS 
derived the following: 
• CALTRANS officials worked to speed the process by 
preparing a list of potential contractors it knew could 
do the work quickly and by streamlining its process, 
clearing as much red tape as possible. 
• Then they drew up a contract offering a $200,000 bonus—
with a limit of $5 million—for each day the work was 
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done in less than 50 days and levying a $200,000 
penalty for each day after that deadline. (Cabanatuan, 
2007, May 25) 
The rebuild was complete in what many perceived to be 
impossible—a mere 25 days.  According to the contractor on 
this job, CC Meyers, there were other externalities that 
contributed to the expedient replacement of the inter-
connect.  The non-adversarial teamwork of CALTRANS made flow 
of information and on-the-spot decision-making seamless.  
According to Carl Douglas, a production manager for one of 
the sub-contractors, Stinger Welding, a steel fabrication 
firm in Arizona: 
CALTRANS came in and put good people in our shop, 
if there were any problems, we could go to them 
and get immediate answers. Usually (done by 
phone, fax or e-mail), it takes weeks.  It was a 
breath of fresh air to have a Government agency 
come in and perform like that.   
Stinger finished the girders in nine days—a job that would 
normally have taken about 45. (Cabanatuan, 2007, May 25)   
Additionally, he mentions the flexibility of CALTRANS 
on some of their processes.  In another example, instead of 
requiring the contactor to wait for detailed construction 
drawings to be approved, CALTRANS agreed to let the work 
start while they were being reviewed.  It was a risk for 
both the contractor and CALTRANS…but was a relatively “safe 
bet” "because the work was so straightforward."  It ended up 
saving about five days. (Cabanatuan, 2007, May 25)  
When determining what type of performance Incentive 
Fees will be given to the contractor, the CO and the PM must 
understand what drives the industries’ willingness to 
innovate and excel. In the I-580 rebuild, it was simple, 
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"It's not about making a huge profit, it's about getting the 
job done and pointing out that you're one of the best 
contractors in the industry” (Cabanatuan, 2007, May 25). 
3. Incentive Fees Based on Quality Performance 
The inherent issues of quality affect the performance 
of contracts.  The plethora of administrative paperwork, to 
include but not limited to: deficient statements of work, 
poor contract administration, and performance delays, are 
indicative of quality shortcomings (Garrett, 1997, p. 100).  
A way that contractors and the DoD seek to mitigate quality 
issues is to be proactively involved in each project.  This 
means that the IPT should work in cohesion using risk-
mitigation tactics to offset known or probable issues with 
the procurement.  The rankings and distribution of the risk 
will equate to tradeoffs in cost, schedule, or performance. 
The critical factor is determining which tradeoff is less of 
a risk to the specific project.  Any neglect in these areas 
reduces the quality of the project and could result in 
increased costs, lengthier delivery, or decreased 
performance. All parties involved in the procurement are 
responsible for the overall quality of the project.   
G. INHERENT PROBLEMS 
When a PM or CO is writing contracts, there is not a 
one-size–fits-all approach to the application of Incentive 
Fees.  Writing varies by personal style, but structure 
remains consistent within an organization.  Before writing a 
contract, the CO and the PM must understand typical issues 
that arise from writing IF proposals. 
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Objective IF face three problematic issues: 
They assume a level of buyer and seller 
competence that may not exist. 
They assume many effects that may not occur. 
They create serious challenges for contract 
administration. (Garrett, 1997, p. 100)   
IF assume that both the Government and the contractor 
are fully reliable in their specific roles and 
responsibilities in the contract.  This is frequently not 
the case.  Contracting personnel sometimes find after 
contract award that the contractor has committed to 
unreasonable, vague, or interpretive Government 
expectations.  In this scenario, open communication is 
absent, causing the Government to expect results that the 
contractor cannot provide (Garrett, 2007a, p. 11). Indeed, 
before the contract starts, it may already be behind 
schedule.  This, in turn, may affect the delivery of the 
procurement, the funding of the procurement, as well as the 
quality of the end-product.   
The second notion, assumptions of effects, relates  to 
the understanding the industry and the company to which the 
DoD awarded the contract.  In many cases, the Government 
assumes that providing the contractor with additional funds 
is an incentive to obtain greater performance.  Although 
contract managers would approve of only one approach to 
objectively incentivized contracts, the DoD is discovering 
other means that produce desired results.  Subsequent 
contract Award and recognition are a few incentives that are 
being experimented with currently as a driver for “above 
average” contractor performance.  Aside from the above 
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assumptions, other problems stem from Incentive Fees 
statements. To write effective Incentive Fees contracts, 
many Contracting Officers seek to establish basic outlining 
principles that would facilitate a cognitive contract 
structure. 
In order to mitigate the burden of administration, 
Contracting Officers should seek guidance in writing 
specialized Incentive Fee criteria.  Using specialized 
incentives creates fee criteria that can be objectively 
measured, mitigating the administrative burden. According to 
Garrett, the following best practices should be used when 
writing Incentive Fees contracts: 
Think creatively. Creativity is a critical aspect 
in the success of performance-based Incentive 
Fees contracting. 
Avoid rewarding sellers for simply meeting 
contract requirements. 
Recognize that developing clear, concise, 
objectively measurable performance Incentive Fees 
will be challenging. Plan accordingly. 
Create a proper balance of objective Incentive 
Fees, cost, schedule, and quality performance. 
Ensure that performance Incentive Fees focus the 
seller’s efforts on the buyer’s objectives. 
Make all forms of performance Incentive Fees 
challenging, yet attainable. 
Ensure that Incentive Fees motivate quality 
control and that the results of the seller’s 
quality control efforts can be measured. 
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Consider tying on-time delivery to cost and/or 
quality performance criteria. 
Recognize that not everything can be measured 
objectively. Consider using a combination of 
objectively measured standards and subjective 
determination Incentive Fees. 
Encourage open communication and ongoing 
involvement with potential sellers in developing 
the performance-based Statement of  Work (SOW) 
and the Incentive Fees plan, both before and 
after issuing the formal request for proposals. 
Consider including socio-economic Incentive Fees 
(non-SOW related) in the Incentive Fees plan. 
Use clear objective formulas for determining the 
Incentive Fees. 
Use positive and negative Incentive Fees, and 
ensure that they have limits. (Garrett, 1997, p. 
102)     
Contract administrators can use the above suggestions 
as a basic guide for how to write an effective Incentive 
Fees statement. In many organizations, leadership, industry, 
and effective style will produce a clear objective; the 
right incentive will decide the outcome. 
Other inherent problems that may be attributable to 
inaccurate and ineffective contract writing, are as Farrior 
describes as “concerns over the imbalance of resources and 
workload with the acquisition force” thus leading to the 
last associated risk (Farrior, 2003, July, p. 31). Issues 
not mentioned, such as delays, many times are inherent with 
incentive-type contracts. According to the GAO, it 
discovered during its investigation that “because of 
Government delays, program officials decided to eliminate 
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delivery Incentive Fees included in the initial contract” 
(GAO, 2005, December, p. 29). This problem is inherent 
within the Government bureaucracy of programs and levels of 
management.  This does not mean that the Incentive Fee 
structure failed, but that the Program Manager failed to 
ensure the Incentive Fees had inputs achieve the desired 
contract results. Awarding large amounts of fee for 
satisfactory performance and offering contractors multiple 
chances to earn previously withheld fees, program managers 
and contracting officers are continuing to foster an 
environment in which the DoD expects to pay, and contractors 
expect to receive, most of the entire available award pool, 
regardless of the project’s outcome (GAO, 2005, p. 33).   
The DoD, as well as agencies such as NASA and the 
Department of Homeland Security, continues to struggle in 
identifying when a particular contract mode and/or 
methodology would best fulfill Government needs.  New 
methodologies require examination to determine if, in fact, 
there are other ways to achieve the end-result. Change must 
be evaluated. Many times, instead of researching the true 
motivation of the contractor, the DoD may dilute the 
motivational effectiveness of fees by paying significant 
amounts for merely satisfactory performance (GAO, 2005, p. 
23).  The bottom line is that regardless of Incentive Fees 
used, a program that is not well conceived, planned, 
managed, funded, and supported, may be easily subject to 
problems such as cost growth, schedule delays, and/or 
performance shortfalls  (GAO, 2005, p. 14).    
Just as the NASA FAR supplement emphasizes, cost 
control should be balanced against other performance 
requirement objectives, and the contractor should not be 
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incentivized to pursue cost control to the point of 
degrading the overall performance (NASA, 2007,p. 8). Some 
programs have structured fees to focus on acquisition 
outcomes, such as the Missile Defense Agency’s Airborne 
Laser program. This contract includes structured Incentive 
Fees to link the demonstration of the system to the fee 
payments. This will ensure that they are more representative 
of the program’s success (GAO, 2005, p. 4).   In order for 
procurement officials to effectively manage incentive fees, 
basic principles must be reinstituted.  Failure to use 
common-sense policy and acquisition skills will no doubt 
contribute to this. As the GAO claims, ”Incentive Fees do 
not consistently motivate contractors”  (GAO, 2005, p. 4). 
Lastly, although cost is the most commonly chosen 
performance variable, it may not be the motivating factor 
(Burt, Dobler & Starling, 2003, p. 442).  Cost incentives 
will only operate effectively in an environment in which 
cost savings are reasonable.  There are many ways to 
incentivize contractors.  Partnerships with industry, 
trained and educated personnel, and a well-versed IPT can 
prepare contract managers for effective incentive tactics. 
Cost is the most commonly chosen performance variable (Burt, 
Dobler & Starling, 2003, p. 442).  
H. SUMMARY 
In summary, it is important to identify the true 
motivation of the contactor. Many studies performed by 
various institutes have discovered that profit is not the 
contractor’s only motivation. Other considerations (such as 
securing future contracts with the Government) can be 
stronger motivators than earning additional profit (GAO, 
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2005, p. 31). Contractors themselves have admitted that fees 
do motivate to some extent; however, the consensus is that 
they are not the primary means, in and of themselves, for 
increasing performance significantly (GAO, 2005, p. 31).    
This chapter discussed key elements of Incentive Fees.  
The researchers contend that in order to better perform an 
analysis of the survey responses, the readers should 
understand the generalities of Incentive Fees.  This chapter 
focused on the objectives of Incentive Fees, implementation, 
how to establish the proper Incentive Fee criterion, and the 
inherent problems with incentive fees. The next chapter will 
focus on the core of the research. It will analyze the 
survey material administered at the 45th Annual Aerospace 














V. ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTOR AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapters provide the foundational support 
for comprehending what contract Incentive Fees and Award-
fees are, which included the definition and the use of fee-
type contracts.  The purpose of this chapter is to analyze 
the data obtained during the 45th Annual Aerospace and 
Defense Contract Management Conference to determine if 
either Government and/or industry agreed or disagreed with 
the GAO reports.  Before the data is analyzed, the GAO 
report will be reviewed; the researchers will examine the 
current issues and recommendations the GAO cited in its 
reports (06-66 (2005, December) & 06-409T (2005)) as an 
overview. We will then compare them to the data obtained 
from the surveys.  In addition, an anonymous DoD Program 
Manager’s (PM) comments pertaining to the GAO 
recommendations mentioned above will be analyzed.  Then, an 
anonymous NASA Contracting Officer’s (CO) opinion will be 
discussed (his comments are similar to the organizational 
issues that will be addressed from the GAO report 07-58) in 
order to examine NASA’s processes. By doing so, the 
researchers hope to identify possible solutions the DoD may 
incorporate into its Incentive Fee and Award-fee contract 
processes. Lastly, this chapter will summarize the compiled 
data that was analyzed. 
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B. SURVEY OF INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES 
The purpose for the surveys was to obtain both DoD 
personnel and contractors’ opinions to determine if they 
agreed with the GAO reports (Dept. of the Air Force, 2002; 
GAO, 2005).  The research was conducted at the 45th annual 
National Contract Management Association (NCMA) Aerospace 
and Defense conference in Garden Grove, California, from 26 
through 27 July 2007.   
Founded in 1959, the NCMA exists to enable the 
workforce to grow professionally, assess individual and 
organizational competency against professional standards, 
establish values, develop best practices, and provide access 
to skilled individuals, enabling enterprises to improve 
their buyer-seller relationships (NCMA, 2006).  NCMA is a 
membership-based, professional society whose leadership is 
comprised of volunteer elected officers.   The focus or 
theme for the NCMA conference this year was “Rules, Risks, 
and Rewards, The Changing Outlook for Aerospace and Defense 
Contracting.”  The 45th annual NCMA conference consist of 
knowledgeable acquisition and contracting management 
professionals and their familiarity with Government 
contracting.  Contract management professionals attending 
the conference possessed experience and knowledge ranging 
from systems-level program management to base-level support 
contracting. Also attending the conference were contractors 
with years of contracting experience—ranging from 
operational, small-dollar contracts to multi-million dollar 




from this project came from Government and contractor 
surveys (See Appendices C and D) that were distributed at 
the NCMA conference.  
The survey questions were developed with assistance 
from NPS Professors.  All surveys were anonymous, only 
stating whether the individual was a Government employee or 
industry professional (a contractor that has worked on 
Government contracts). The survey questions presented at the 
conference were based on statements from the two reports 
(06-66 (2005, December) and 06-409T (2005)) written by the 
GAO.   
The contractor’s survey consisted of seven total 
statements assessing whether the individual agreed or 
disagreed with the reports’ conclusions. Responses ranged 
from strongly agree to strongly disagree (See Appendices C 
and D).  The Government and contractor surveys were 
comprised of identical statements. The Government surveys, 
however, included six additional statements that will be 
analyzed individually after the seven identical statements 
are analyzed.  The additional Government statements relate 
more to the internal knowledge and in-depth understanding of 
the DoD.  
There were 102 total responses, which included 26 
Government responses (with 19% leaving comments), and 76 
contractor responses (with 32% leaving comments).  In the 
individual survey analysis section of the chapter, the 
options “Strongly Agree” and “Agree” will be combined for 
simplicity.  This will also apply to the options “Strongly 
Disagree” and “Disagree.” Thus, when the calculations are 
shown, “Agree”, “Disagree” and “Neutral” are the only titles 
in the analysis.   
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C. BACKGROUND 
1. Review of the GAO Report 06-66 & 06-409T  
GAO Reports 06-66 (2005, December) and 06-409T (2005) 
are, in fact, two separate reports; however, these reports 
do identify similar issues.  For instance, one topic noted 
in both reports relates to Award-fees in relation to 
contractor accountability for achieving desired outcomes.  
Another related example was the paying of contractor Award-
fees for satisfactory performance and the granting of second 
chances to obtain unearned fees for a previous Award-fee 
period.   
The DoD allows its contractors to receive billions of 
dollars due to financial Incentive Fees (Award and Incentive 
Fees).  These fees are aimed at incentivizing the contractor 
to complete requirements with above-satisfactory performance 
in sections that are considered essential to an acquisition 
program’s success.  Award-fees are especially suitable in 
instances in which contracting and program officials cannot 
create objective IF fee targets associated to the cost, 
technical performance, or schedule. 
The GAO was asked to verify if Award and Incentive Fees 
have been used successfully as a means for reaching the 
DoD’s desired acquisition outcomes.  The GAO review was 
conducted from February 2004 to November 2005.  The GAO 
selected a prospective sample of 93 contracts from the study 
population of 597 DoD Award and Incentive Fees-fee 
contracts.  These were active between fiscal years 1999 and 
2003, included at least one fee using cost-plus-award-fee 
and cost-plus-incentive-fees-fee, as well as other contracts 
involving Award and Incentive Fee type contracts with a fee 
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valued at $10 million or more during that period.  Unless 
otherwise noted, the estimates in this report related to AF 
and IF contracts in this population, the subpopulation of 
Award-fee contracts, and the evaluation periods associated 
with contracts described in the two previously mentioned 
situations that were accomplished during the GAO review.  
The estimates of total Award-fees earned and total Award-
fees earned after contractors received a second chance are 
based on all evaluation periods held from the start of the 
GAO sample contracts through the GAO’s data collection phase 
(GAO, 2005, December, pp. 2-3). 
Out of the 597 contract reviews by GAO, a sample of 93 
contracts was selected: 52 contracts dealt with only Award-
fee provisions; 27 contracts included only Incentive Fees 
provisions, and 14 had both Award and Incentive Fees 
provisions.  The types of contracts for products and 
services analyzed in the GAO assessment included: ship 
construction, aircraft and aircraft-related procurements, 
non-research-and-development services, and research-and-
development projects. The GAO interviewed program officials 
on issues relating to the growth, implementation, and 
effectiveness of the Award and Incentive Fees structures 
using a standard questionnaire. It also analyzed these 
officials’ remedies for each of the 93 contracts in its 
sample.  The GAO also accessed information related to these 
areas and examined fee payments in the context of program 
performance. The GAO gained insight from acquisition policy 
officials and also examined recent policy initiatives, 
reports, and audits related to the DoD’s use of Award and 
Incentive Fees (GAO, 2005, December, pp. 2-3). 
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2. GAO Findings for 06-66  
The GAO found that DoD customers are tolerating cost 
overruns and delays in order to receive the requested 
program or acquisition. The DoD existing methodology 
concerning monetary Incentive Fees reveals these truths has 
resulted in numerous unsuccessful attempts at holding the 
contractors liable for delivering and supporting fielded 
capabilities within cost and schedule baselines.  While the 
DoD and contractors share the responsibility for program 
success, effective utilization of Award and Incentive Fees 
must be restructured to support program outcomes.  The 
issue of contractors receiving awards for satisfactory 
performance generates from poor training among other 
inefficiencies within the DoD.  This trend will affect 
critical milestones within programs and overall success of 
acquisition, if change does not occur.  Awarding large 
amounts of fee for satisfactory or lesser performance and 
offering contractors multiple chances to earn previously 
withheld fees, has fostered an environment in which the DoD 
expects to pay and contractors expect to receive most of 
the available Award-fee regardless of outcomes.  In 
addition, the DoD lack of information on how well Award and 
Incentive Fees are achieving their intended purpose leaves 
the Department vulnerable to millions of dollars of 
potential looses.  
3. GAO Recommendations 
GAO recommendations to improve the link between program 
outcome and contractor performance is the DoD must have 
accountability for the effects of the types of incentives 
used in relation to contractor results achieved. The 
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Secretary of Defense, Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics incorporating seven 
actions, also mandated this. 
The DoD must instruct the military services to 
restructure their Award-fee criteria so that they are more 
outcome-related, realistic, and ensure accountability for 
the overall outcomes. The DoD must also ensure that Award-
fee structures are incentivizing exceptional contractor 
performance by only paying Award-fees for above-satisfactory 
performance, and require the appropriate approving officials 
to review new contracts to make certain that these actions 
are being carried out. The DoD has the ability to enhance 
its use of Award-fees on all open contracts by distributing 
DoD guidance on when the use of a roll over is acceptable. 
In the future, the DoD has an opportunity to refine its use 
of Award and Incentive Fees by creating a method for 
compiling Award and Incentive Fees-fee data within existing 
data systems to gauge the effectiveness of Award and 
Incentive Fees as a medium for sharpening contractor 
performance and achieving desired program outcomes. The 
GAO’s final recommendation to the DoD is to establish a 
system to share reliable Incentive Fees strategies for the 
acquisition of different types of products and services with 
contracting and program officials throughout the DoD. 
D. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
1. Analysis I 
The DoD Acquisition Process for Weapons Programs 
Consistently Yields Undesirable Consequences— 
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Cost Increases, Late Deliveries to the War-
Fighter, and Performance Shortfalls. 
 
 
















26.9% of Government respondents overall disagreed with 
this statement. 34.6% of Government personnel were neutral 
to Statement 1, while 38.5% overall agreed with the 
statement. (See comparison chart Q1 above.)  
Contractor Analysis 
35.5% of contractor respondents overall disagreed with 
the GAO report on the statement listed above. 29% of 
industry contactors were neutral on this statement, while 
35.5% of the industry contractors who participated in the 
survey agreed with the statement. (See comparison chart Q1 
above.) 
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Comparison Analysis  
By evaluating the percentages of the surveyed 
responses, the researchers find that DoD contracts do not 
have adequate acquisition processes in place to meet the 
war-fighters’ needs. Comprehensive analysis suggests, based 
on respondents’ experience utilizing Award and Incentive 
Fees, that there is not an adequate process in place to meet 
mission needs and capabilities.  This issue is generated by 
a number of internal and external deficiencies, like pre-
planning for the acquisition program and collaborating with 
industry.  In the pre-planning stages, the Government should 
be accomplishing market research, trying to understand the 
industry capabilities available to meeting mission 
requirements.  This is only one solution to assist in 
conceptualizing requirements and what it will take to 
complete those requirements.  Based on the GAO reports’ 
assessment and the agreement of both the Government and 
industry, there are significant problems with the DoD 
acquisition process. 
Listed below are some comments from Government and 
industry personnel.  26.9% of the Government acquisition 
employees disagreed with this statement.  Survey 4 was 
included in that percentage, which mentioned that the GAO 
only used a fraction of the Incentive Fees and Award-fee 
contracts available to the DoD. If the GAO reviewed the 
entire list of contracts in the DoD, the numbers would then 
be scaled correctly. Survey 14 (contractor) makes mention as 
to why they did not have much success working on DoD 
acquisitions.  The comments made by Survey 14 suggest other 
 82
areas that may have lead to the undesirable consequences. 
These specific surveys are cited below.  
Government Survey 4 
A few large dollar contracts incentivizing narrow areas 
without regard for larger cost, schedule, or quality issues 
skew the evaluation of hundreds of smaller Award-fee 
contracts properly managed and Award-fee applied. 
Contractor/Industry Survey 14 
1. The goal is to win the contract; however pricing is 
not always aligned with the requirement.  
2. Performance metrics are not clear in the Request for 
Proposal (RFP) process.  
3. Poor Statements of Work (SOW) both the agencies 
generated and contractor’s proposals are usually poorly 
written and inconsistent with intent.  
4. Clarification of system contracts and visibility 
into effort usually occurs after preliminary design.   
5. Drawings, specifications are usually not finalized 
until the program has started.   
6. Baseline cost is usually established on out- dated 
pricing with little visibility into the subcontracted effort 
until after award. 
 83
2. Analysis II 
Award and Incentive Fees are not Effective Tools for 
Achieving the DoD Desired Acquisition Outcomes. 












Figure 6.   Comparison Chart Statement 2 Contractor Q2 
 
Government Analysis 
54.9% of Government respondents disagreed with this 
statement. 19.2% of Government respondents were neutral on 
Statement 2, while 26.9% overall agreed with this statement. 
(See comparison chart Q2 above.) 
Contractor Analysis 
59.2% of contractor respondents overall disagreed with 
the GAO report on Statement 2 listed above. 11.8% of 
industry contactors were neutral on this statement, while 
29% of the contractors that participated in the survey 
agreed with this statement. (See comparison chart Q2 above.) 
Comparison Analysis  
The goal of Award and Incentive Fee contracts is to 
motivate contractor performance. Both the Government and the 
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contractor respondents involved in the survey agreed that 
Award and Incentive Fees are effective tools for obtaining 
desired outcomes, if executed properly. Therefore, there may 
be a discrepancy regarding the proper use of these types of 
Incentive Fee contracts.  Most Government and contractor 
respondents believed that poor training and enforcement of 
the policies already in place was the dilemma.  That 
observation was, in fact, the opposite of what was inferred 
in the GAO reports. 
Listed below are some comments from both parties 
concerning this statement.  Government Survey Respondent 1 
was among the 54.9% that disagreed with this statement, but 
have some reservations as to how the Government utilizes 
Incentive Fees.  Contractor Survey Respondent 7 was also 
among the majority of industry that disagreed with this 
statement. 
Government Survey 1 
The DOD acquisition process consistently delivers 
effective weapons systems.  We have been the best-equipped 
military in the world.  Incentive Fees, by and large, have 
been very poorly used, and when used not always enforced.  
Award-fees should be a small portion of the reward 
(earnings) available for any weapons system. 
Contractor/Industry Survey 7 
I am a contract representative for a CPAF contract. I 
believe that the Government has done an excellent job in 
managing this contract. A CPAF contract increases the 
opportunity for rewarding innovative suggestions that 
increase services and satisfaction for the Government. 
Award-fees also increase contractor performance. Our team 
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works extremely hard and always places customer service on 
the forefront of our minds.  The metrics that are used to 
measure performance on this contract are all inclusive and 
very strict.  The Government has truly set very high 
standards of performance. 
3. Analysis III 
The DoD Gives Contractors Multiple Chances to Earn 
Award-Fees that they Failed to Earn in Previous 
Evaluation Periods, Informally Known as “Roll 
Over.” 
 












Figure 7.   Comparison Chart Statement 3 Contractor Q3 
 
Government Analysis 
19.3% of Government respondents overall disagreed with 
this statement. 26.9% of Government personnel were neutral, 
while 53.8% overall agreed with the statement. (See 




32.9% of contractor respondents disagreed with the GAO 
report on Statement 3 listed above. 42.1% of contactors 
respondents were neutral, while 25% of the contractors that 
participated in the survey agreed with Statement 3. (See 
comparison chart Q3 above) 
Comparison Analysis  
Based on the data acquired from the survey, more than 
half of the Government respondents agreed with the GAO 
regarding this statement.  The majority of the contractor 
respondents stayed neutral. The Air Force Award-fee Guide 
(2002) allows for “rollovers” in certain situations and with 
the approval of the FDO under section 4.5 of guide.  In the 
NASA Award-fee Contracting Guide, it mentions that “roll 
over” is non-permissible in service contracting. When a fee 
remains from a previous period, “roll over” is not 
automatic. Specific provisions only make it applicable in 
certain scenarios. However, rolling over fees can be in the 
Government’s best interest if a program has the potential 
for failure in some instances (Garrett, 2007a, p.13). 
 




4. Analysis IV 
Monetary Incentive Fees Provisions Improve Performance 
on DoD Contracts. 












Figure 8.   Comparison Chart Statement 4 Contractor Q4 
 
Government Analysis 
26.9% of Government respondents disagreed with this 
statement.  23.1% of Government respondents were neutral on 
this statement, while 50% overall agreed with  Statement 4. 
(See comparison chart Q4 above.) 
Contractor Analysis 
21.1% of contractor respondents overall disagreed with 
the GAO report on the statement listed above. 19.7% of 
contactor respondents were neutral on this statement while 
59.2% of the contractors that participated in the survey 
agreed with this statement. (See comparison chart Q4 above.) 
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Survey 21 comments on the respondent’s company’s 
experience with Award-fees (as in survey 4 above), and 
examines the cost on more of a “big picture,” strategic 
level versus a tactical level. 
Contractor Survey 21 
In my experience Award-fees work, contractors work hard 
to earn max Award-fees.  If they are handed out free “Award-
fees”, then someone is not doing their job and that should 
be fixed.  The system works, do not break it just because a 
large program may have gone astray. 
Comparison Analysis  
Based on the cumulative percentages derived from the 
survey, it can be concluded that acquisition personnel on 
both sides of the process agree—when utilized properly,   
that monetary Incentive Fees do improve performance on 
contracts. Alternative Incentive Fee arrangements, in 
addition to Award and Incentive Fees, such as award terms, 
are also utilized by DoD to give the acquisition community 
other approaches to incentivizing contracts. The use of 
monetary Incentive Fees may be questionable according to the 
GAO; however, informal responses from the respondents of the 
NCMA conference indicate that it is a tremendous motivator.   
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5. Analysis V 
Competitions for Funding on Contracts in Systems 
Acquisitions Lead to Underestimated Costs and 
Over-Promised Capabilities. 












Figure 9.   Comparison Chart Statement 5 Contractor Q5 
 
Government Analysis 
24% of Government respondents disagreed with this 
statement. 12% of Government respondents were neutral, while 
64% agreed with this statement. (See comparison chart Q5 
above.) 
Contractor Analysis 
30.3% of contractor respondents disagreed with the GAO 
report on this statement. 14.5% of contactor respondents 
were neutral, while 55.2% of the contractors that 
participated in the survey agreed with this statement. (See 




Comparison Analysis  
The majority of Government and contractor respondents 
taking part in the survey agreed with this statement.  From 
their experience, Government engineers and cost analysts 
commonly underestimate cost using dated information or 
pricing catalogs to create estimates that are then evaluated 
side-by-side with the contractor’s estimate.  If the 
contractor wants the contract, the contractor would concede 
to the terms and conditions of the contract, knowing the 
contract requirements are unattainable.  This issue would be 
corrected if the PM and CO would collaborate with the 
contractor early in the acquisition process and  create a 
relationship with the contractor to ensure specifications 
are attainable and cost justifiable. According to other 
informal responses received from contract managers 
(Government and contractor) attending the conference, 
competition for funding on contracts in systems acquisition 
is a problem.   
Shown below are some comments from industry concerning  
Statement 5. Survey 3 strongly disagreed with this 
statement.  Survey 23 makes mention of the strain on 
contractors when funding and Government estimates are not 
accurate.  Survey 2 also expresses some distress in dealing 
with the Government underestimating acquisition cost in past 
experiences. 
Contractor/Industry Survey 3 
I believe underestimated cost and over promised 
capabilities result not from competition but are determined 
from budgets based on estimates that are set before design  
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is completed.  In other words, capabilities and features 
keep being designed after detailed estimates and program 
budgets are established. 
Contractor/Industry Survey 23 
Incentive Fees and Award-fees will be effective when 
contracts are awarded at high confidence cost estimates.  
Funding and competition leads to unrealistic cost estimates 
and performance baselines “out of the short.” 
Contractor/Industry Survey 2 
I have managed CPAF contracts and feel that while it 
was difficult to satisfy to Government expectations, the 
taxpayer benefited from the situation.  I believe the 
contracts work but it depends on both parties.  I have 
experienced more often than not the Government 
underestimates actual acquisition cost for the program, 
which made it even tougher for the contractor. 
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6. Analysis VI 
Outcome-Based Award-fee Criteria that are Both 
Achievable and Promote Accountability for 
Acquisition Outcomes will Optimize Award-Fees. 










Figure 10.   Comparison Chart Statement 6 Contractor Q6 
 
Government Analysis 
12% of Government respondents disagreed with this 
statement. 4% of Government respondents were neutral,   
while 84% overall agreed with this statement. (See 
comparison chart Q6 above.) 
Contractor Analysis 
11.9% of contractor respondents overall disagreed with 
the GAO report on the statement listed above.  18.4% of 
contactor respondents were neutral, while 69.7% of the 
contractors that participated in the survey agreed with the 
statement. (See comparison chart Q6 above.) 
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Comparison Analysis  
The data from the surveys indicates that outcome-based 
Award-fee criteria that are both achievable and promote 
accountability for acquisition outcome will optimize Award-
fees.  By focusing more on acquisition outcomes and tying 
them into AF, the contractor and Government can ensure they 
understand exactly what evaluations will occur during the 
Award-fee period. For accountability purposes, the 
contractor is accountable for at least meeting the minimum 
standard of performance at the Award-fee period and is 
accountable for, more importantly, the program outcome.   
The Government carries the responsibility of evaluating the 
contractor. Evaluating the contractor also means monitoring 
cost, schedule, and performance, and giving the FDO an 
accurate assessment of the contract to incentivize the 
contractor to enhance performance or continue excellent 
performance. 
Contractor/Industry Survey 9 
The key to Award-fee success is indeed outcome-based 
criteria that focus on cost schedule and technical 
performance. Nevertheless, be careful on the “excellence” 
focus.  I believe the focus should be on “success 
performance.” If the contractor is meeting program 
performance, requirements and providing war fighter support, 
that deserves a reward. An over focus on “excellence” can 
miss focus on the performance success. 
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7. Analysis VII 
The DoD Award-fee Structures Motivate Excellent 
Performance by Only Paying Award-Fees for 
Excellent Performance. 












Figure 11.   Comparison Chart Statement 7 Contractor Q7 
 
Government Analysis 
64% of Government respondents disagreed with the 
statement above. 12% of Government respondents were neutral 
on Statement 7, while 24% overall agreed with the statement. 
(See comparison chart Q7 above.) 
Contractor Analysis 
29% of contractor respondents overall disagreed with 
the GAO report on the statement listed above. 40.8% of 
contactor respondents were neutral, while 30.2% of the 
contractors that participated in the survey agreed with this 
statement. (See comparison chart Q7 above.)  
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Comparison Analysis  
GAO reports 06-409T and 06-66 both mention the DoD 
inability to properly incentivize contractors and poor 
administration of Incentive Fee and Award-fee contracts.  
64% of the Government respondents agreed with this 
statement.  Most of the contracts review by the GAO had an 
Award-fee payout at each Award-fee period (regardless of 
contractor performance and schedule) of more than 90% of the 
available Award-fee.   
Despite the contract modifications and changes to 
specifications, getting the war-fighters their requirements 
in a timely manner is the mission. When employed correctly, 
Incentive Fee and Award-fee contracts are two of the 
vehicles accessible for delivering capabilities to the 
Government beyond standard performance. However, the DoD is 
not properly employing Incentive Fees and Award-fees to 
encourage excellent contractor performance according to the 
respondents that participated in the survey. 
Analysis of Additional Government Questions 
The Government surveys completed at the NCMA conference 
consisted of 13 total statements, six more than the 
contractor survey. Those six additional questions are 
analyzed separately below. 
8. Analysis VIII 
The DoD Frequently Pays Most of the Available Award-
Fee for what it Describes as Improved Contractor 
Performance, Regardless of Whether Outcomes Fell 
Short of, Met, or Exceeded Expectations. 
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Figure 12.   Comparison Chart Statement 8 Government Q4 
 
Government Analysis  
26.9% of Government respondents disagreed with the 
above statement. 26.9% of Government respondents were 
neutral on Statement 8, while 46.2% overall agreed with the 
statement. (See Government analysis chart Q4 above.) 
Analysis of Government Statement   
The Government respondents agreed with this statement.  
The DoD pays contractors Award-fees (from one PM 
perspective) because of the “likeability” factor, which has 
to do with wanting to have a good working relationship with 
the contractor. This topic is discussed later in the 
chapter.  Time to administer and monitor the contractor’s 
performance on contracts is limited.  So, for example, if 
the evaluator is not evaluating the contractors’ performance 
over a 6-month span, the project may never be completed the 
correct way.  This disregard can contribute to last-minute, 
inaccurate performance assessments and recommendations to 
the Award Review Board by the monitors in order to keep 
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award-fee process moving and satisfy monitoring their 
requirements.  This leads to the possibility of program 
acquisitions falling behind schedule, and ambiguity in the 
Government defining “excellent” performances (Garrett, 
2007a, p. 14). 
Training the performance monitors and ensuring 
performance evaluations are completed is a fundamental 
necessity in Award-fee contracts. Once the performance 
monitor completes the assessment of contractor performance 
based on the Award-fee plan, the contractor then would begin 
to understand that following the award plan is essential to 
receiving the available Award-fee for the period.    
9. Analysis IX 
The DoD Pays Contractors Award-Fees for Satisfactory 
Performance, Even Though the Acquisition 
Regulations and Guidance Intend Such Fees be Used 
to Motivate Excellent Performance. 











Figure 13.   Comparison Chart Statement 9 Government Q5 
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Government Analysis 
19.2% of Government respondents disagreed with this 
statement. 15.4% of Government respondents were neutral on 
Statement 9, while 65.4% agreed with this statement. (See 
comparison chart Q5 above.) 
Government Survey 2 
If Award and Incentive Fees were truly given for 
exceptional performance, then I believe they would be a 
better Incentive Fees.  As it is now, most of the fee is 
given regardless of the performance so is little contractor 
Incentive Fees to manage the cost or performance.  As with 
most things, lack of training has weakened the use and 
benefits of Award and Incentive Fees. 
Analysis of Government Statement   
Survey 2 mentions training as one of the reasons why 
the DoD is paying the contractor what it should be receiving 
for achieving excellent performance. However, training is 
just one of the many reasons why this is occurring with the 
DoD. There is also a lack of personnel to monitor contractor 
performance. When a monitor is assigned the responsibility 
of more than three or four contract-performance evaluations, 
the evaluation process may suffer.  Whichever contract is 
the most important to the monitor will be the first to be 
evaluated, and the rest will follow somewhere else in the 
list of priorities.  To break this habit, the DoD must 
retrain its monitors so that they understand the 
expectations and the purpose of Award-fee type contracts. 
The DoD must obligate the monitor and other members of the 
Award-fee determination board to follow policy “or else.” 
(Dept. of the Air Force, 2002, pp. 13-17). 
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10.  Analysis X 
In the Development and Administration of Award-fee and 
Incentive Fees, Training is Inadequate. 











Figure 14.   Comparison Chart Statement 10 Government Q7 
 
Government Analysis 
7.7% of Government respondents disagreed with this 
statement. 0% of Government respondents were neutral on 
Statement 10, while 92.3% overall agreed with this 
statement. (See Government Analysis chart Q7 above.) 
Government Survey 5 
The policy is there, but an execution mechanism is not.  
There is no consistency across the DoD; there is a lack of 





Analysis of Government Statement  
Survey 5 makes the point that policy is in place, but 
policy is not adhered to.  It is the responsibility of the 
Program Managers and the FDO to ensure policy compliance.  
If an organization is not following policy, consequences 
should be enforced and repercussions should follow.  92% of 
Government respondents agreed that training will begin to 
rectify this issue. 
11. Analysis XI 
The DoD has a Mechanism for Capturing Award and 
Incentive Fee Data within Existing Data Systems. 











Figure 15.   Comparison Chart Statement 11 Government Q11 
 
Government Analysis 
53.8% of Government respondents disagreed with the 
above statement. 15.5% of Government respondents were 
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neutral on Statement 11, while 30.7% overall agreed with the 
statement. (See Government Analysis Q11 below.) 
Analysis of Government Statement  
Government respondents partially agreed with GAO 
recommendations about collecting Award and Incentive Fees 
data and developing performance measures to evaluate the 
effectiveness of Award and Incentive Fees in improving 
acquisition outcomes.  The DoD stated that the Director of 
the Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 
with the assistance of military departments and defense 
agencies would be conducting that study. A little more than 
half of the Government respondents agreed with this 
suggestion. Once the information is collected, it will 
enable the DoD to see if Incentive Fee and Award-fee type 
contracts are effective motivators for contractors. 
 102
12.  Analysis XII 
The DoD Shares Proven Incentive Fees Strategies for 
the Acquisition of Different Types of Products 
and Services with Contracting and Program 
Officials Across the DoD. 











Figure 16.   Comparison Chart Statement 12 Government Q12 
 
Government Analysis 
46.2% of Government respondents disagreed with this 
statement. 30.8% of Government respondents were neutral on 
Statement 12, while 23% overall agreed with the statement. 
(See Government Analysis Q12 below.) 
 
Analysis of Government Statement 12 
The DoD, according to the GAO reports, had no mechanism 
in place to evaluate the effectiveness of Incentive Fee and 
Award-fee contracts. In Fact, the DoD concurred with the GAO 
and developed a mechanism to share proven Incentive Fee 
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strategies (GAO, 2005, p. 16).  If the DoD was relaying 
information about best practices, lesson learned, or proven 
strategies, then documentation was non-existent when the GAO 
completed its evaluation.   
Almost half of Government respondents taking this 
survey at the NCMA conference disagreed with this statement, 
thus indicating that information sharing is a key issue.   
13. Analysis XIII 
The DoD has Developed Performance Measures to Evaluate 
the Effectiveness of Award and Incentive Fees as 
a Tool for Improving Contractor Performance and 
Achieving Desired Program Outcomes. 











Figure 17.   Comparison Chart Statement 13 Government Q13 
 
Government Analysis 
50% of Government respondents disagreed with this 
statement. 15.4% of Government respondents were neutral on 
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Statement 13, while 34.6% overall agreed with the statement. 
(See Government Analysis Q13 below.) 
Analysis of Government Statement 13 
As mentioned in Analysis 12, the DoD has already 
acknowledged that it had not established a means to share 
the effectiveness of Incentive Fees and Award-fees.  These 
issues correlate with each other.  The resolution of one 
will assist the DoD in gaining insight into a feasible 
approach for the other. Again, the majority of the 
Government respondents disagreed with this statement. 
Without a single access point for acquisition information, 
it will be difficult for organizations to acknowledge 
measurement capabilities. 
E. DOD ANONYMOUS PM PERSPECTIVE 
Additionally, information and insight about this report 
was obtained from an anonymous Government program manager 
(PM), currently serving in the United States Air Force. This 
anonymous PM completed a paper on his experience with 
Government contracts in relation to some of the issues the 
GAO pointed out during their review.  The anonymous PM 
research and perspective will be discussed relating to the 
GAO report (GAO, 2005, December).  
GAO reports 06-66 (2005, December) and 06-409T (2005) 
both address similar recommendations and mention the DoD use 
of Incentive Fees and Award-fees on programs acquisitions 
and/or requirements. The GAO’s most significant findings (as 
mentioned earlier) were based on the DoD inability to 
correlate the program outcome to the Award-fees, the need to 
maximize the use of contractor motivators to increase 
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contractor performance, and the DoD lack of a mechanism for 
capturing the data to evaluate effectiveness of Incentive 
Fees and Award-fees in motivating the contractor to achieve 
above-standard/satisfactory performance. 
The anonymous PM research paper based on GAO report 06-
66 focused on why Government Award-fee practices failed to 
achieve desired program outcomes. The PM agreed with the GAO 
assessment involving Award-fees paid in relation to 
schedule, mentioned in Statements 4 and 5 of the Government 
survey, and disagreed with Statements 1 and 10 of the same 
survey listed below.   
1. The DoD Acquisition process for weapons programs 
consistently yields undesirable consequences—cost 
increases, late deliveries to the war-fighter, and 
performance shortfalls. 
 
4. The DoD frequently pays most of the available Award-
fee for what it describes as improved contractor 
performance, regardless of whether outcomes fell short 
of, met, or exceeded expectations. 
 
5. The DoD pays contractors Award-fees for satisfactory 
performance even though the acquisition regulations and 
guidance intends for such fees to be used to motivate 
excellent performance. 
 
10. The DoD Award-fee structure motivates excellent 
contractor performance by only paying Award-fees for 
excellent performance. 
 
 The PM suggested the failure, from his experience, 
stems from the desire to maintain a good Government and 
contractor relationship, the priority of Award-fee 
administration, the use of inappropriate Award-fee criteria, 
and the payment of fees for only satisfactory performance. 
Desire to maintain a good Government and contract 
relationship 
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The anonymous PM also cited Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs, focusing on the social needs at this level: that some 
individuals want to be liked by others with whom they 
associate or have a relationship.  The PM states that this 
is, in fact, true for the Government. It wants to have a 
good “working” relationship within the organization as well 
as with the contractor.  This type of relationship turns out 
to be more significant in CPAF-type contracts, in which the 
Award-fee period comes into play.  During the Award-fee 
period, the performance monitors assess how well the 
contractor performed in relation to the schedule or plan for 
that period.   It is during the evaluation stage that the 
monitor’s judgment becomes clouded by the “likeability” 
factor, which affects the true rating of the contractor 
performance and the end-product of the program or 
acquisition. 
A higher performance rating given to the contractor 
during the Award-fee period means more money for the 
contractor at the end of each Award-fee period.  That 
additional fee paid to the contractor based on 
“likeability,” or a personal relationship, has the potential 
to increase acquisition cost and create future delay if such 
issues are not already present in the contract. The long-
term effects of this manor of evaluation change the 
Incentive Fee type contracts like CPAF or CPIF, evolving 
them into a less effective motivator for contractor 
performance.  
Priority of Award-fee administration by monitors 
The Air Force Award-fee Guide (2002) mentions numerous 
precautions for using Award-fees. It states that contracts 
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including Award-fee Incentive Fees require an added 
administrative and management effort and should only be used 
when the contract amount, performance period, and expected 
benefit warrant the additional administrative and management 
effort (p. 2). Award-fee precautions are also mentioned in 
section 3.2, entitled “Criteria for Selecting Award-fee 
Contracts.” This section warns Contracting Officers to 
document the contract file as to why they are selecting 
Award-fees and also show that a cost benefit analysis was 
conducted and that the benefits of the procurement 
outweighed the administrative burden and/or cost associated. 
Federal Acquisition Regulation 16.405-2b(iii), as well as 
the NASA Award-fee Contracting Guide (2001) mandates that an 
analysis be completed before a program utilizes the Award-
fee type contract. 
The daily tasks associated with Award-fee contracts 
administration include heavy monitoring by the performance 
monitors; this can sometimes become a chore.  Eventually, 
the increased workload from this type of contract gets 
pushed further and further down the list of priorities. In 
addition, some program managers are utilized as monitors. 
They are then responsible for monitoring their programs as 
well as supervising other specialists or monitors in other 
areas of their program. At times, this responsibility can 
become quite challenging because the subject-matter expert 
may be allocated to more than one program/project at any 
given time. Should the expert, in some cases the engineer, 
have more important evaluations to complete (as stated 
earlier), work may get pushed further and further back. 
Then, at the end of the evaluation period, the performance 
monitor may submit a desirable score, despite the 
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contractor’s sub-standard performance, either reflecting 
favoritism towards the contractor or reflecting the 
performance monitor’s lack of interest. 
Use of Inappropriate Award-fee Criteria 
Both the DoD and NASA were cited in GAO reports (06-66, 
07-58) for their use of numerous sub-factors in evaluating 
the contractor performance. However, as mentioned 
previously, both the NASA Award-fee Guide (2001) and the Air 
Force Award-fee Guide (2002) mention that too many factors 
and sub-factors can dilute contractor focus and performance 
(Dept. of the Air Force, 2002, Sec 6.5.3). 
Payment of Fees for Satisfactory Performance 
The GAO and the anonymous author both share the same 
opinion on Award-fees payment for “satisfactory” 
performance, asserting that such payment fails to 
incentivize the contractor to perform above the minimum 
contract standards. By compensating the contractor for 
minimum contract performance, the PM and CO fail to hold the 
contractor accountable for program outcomes.   
The GAO report 06-66 (2005, December) states the DoD 
may be weakening the motivational effectiveness of Incentive 
Fees and Award-fees by paying significant fees for minimum 
or satisfactory performance.  In the GAO study, the sample 
showed more than half of Government “Award-fee only” 
contracts paid out 70% or higher for “acceptable, average, 
expected, good, or satisfactory” performance, with only 12% 
of the contracts paying no fee for this category (GAO, 2005, 
December, p. 24).  There is very little motivation in this 
case for the contractor to achieve excellent performance 
because the majority of the Award-fee, if not all that is 
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available, is being paid regardless of satisfactory 
performance or acquisition cost overruns.  
The PM mentioned that if the DoD has a desire to Award-
fees for satisfactory performance, the strategy then would 
be then to raise the base fee.  The latter portion of the 
Award-fee pool would then be in place distinctively for 
incentivizing excellent contractor performance.  In GAO 
report 06-66 (2005, December), almost two-thirds of the 
contracts reviewed included a zero base fee.  Having a zero 
base fee creates a stronger Incentive Fee to pay for average 
work performance because the Government feels obliged to 
give the contractor more of the Award-fee pool, which is 
considered definite profit, due to having a zero base fee 
(GAO, 2005, December).  
F. NASA ANONYMOUS CO PERSPECTIVE 
The researchers gained another perspective during the 
NCMA conference by gathering data from a NASA contracting 
officer who has experience working as a contracting officer 
in the DoD.  NASA is a different organization; however, some 
similarities can be drawn between it and the DoD. For 
example, the GAO report that was completed on NASA, GAO 
report 07-58 (2007, January), listed problems and 
recommendations similar, if not identical, to those 
attributed to the DoD. Therefore, any experience from 
similar organizations is considered relevant to this 
research project.  




The DoD frequently pays most of the available Award-fee 
for what it describes as improved contractor 
performance, regardless of whether outcomes fell short 
of, met, or exceeded expectations. 
 
The anonymous CO, having worked in both environments at 
some point as a contracting officer, stated that NASA’s 
culture and environment is somewhat different from the DoD.  
In the DoD, rules and regulations govern the administration 
of most contracts, and contracting officers direct the 
contractors.  At NASA, in some situations, the engineer is 
viewed as having little or no regard for the contracting 
officer’s responsibility in the acquisition or program 
development and outcomes.  In other words, the engineers 
advise and/or direct the contractors to perform and/or 
modify work as they see fit. Then, they ask the contracting 
officer to justify, modify, and/or correct their (the 
engineer’s) actions.  This type of habit also affects 
performance and evaluation for the contractor.   
If the evaluation factors are already established 
between the contractor and Government, and the engineer adds 
additional requirements or specifications to the list that 
are not identified under the performance factors and sub-
factors, confusion will arise. For instance, the contractor 
might easily assume that because the engineer advised the 
contractor to make changes or modify something, the 
performance evaluation factor will change as well.  When the 
changes are not generated from the contracting officer (who 
would then change the performance evaluation plan), the 
contractors may or may not receive the entire available 
Award-fee for a given period.   
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However, changes should not be occurring on the 
performance evaluation plan, without notifying the 
contracting officer? Overall performance outcome and 
evaluation factors or sub-factors may not always relate to 
those issues causing the contractor to receiving payment for 
subpar performance of contracts. The Government can also 
take some of the blame in the cost overruns and schedule 
delays.  
G. SUMMARY 
The information collected from the surveys distributed 
at the 45th Annual Aerospace and Defense Contract Management 
Conference was analyzed, along with the comments from a 
Government Program Manager and Contracting Officer.  The 
comments from Government and Contractor/Industry also were 
examined to find out whether Acquisition professionals 
agreed with the GAO reports 06-66 and 06-409T.  Overall, the 
responses from the survey and comments suggest that the DoD 
should focus on training and administration of Award-fees, 
and that often, the DoD pays for satisfactory performance.  
These findings correlate to a few of the GAO conclusions 
regarding fees. It can be inferred from the survey results 
that many contractors feel that fees are commensurate with 
performance. Other comments also suggest that a 
“partnership” and understanding between each organization 
should be a focus in the acquisition process. 
Provided in this chapter was an in-depth analysis of 
the responses obtained from the 45th Annual Aerospace and 
Defense Contract Management Conference.  While some of the 
information presented a distinct correlation in the opinions 
from contract managers, others did not.  The researchers 
 112
contend that further analysis of this issue may present 
information that may be beneficial to the Government and 
industry.  The next chapter will discuss potential areas for 






















VI. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AREAS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discussed the acquisition 
workforce respondents’ views, based on the surveys presented 
at an NCMA conference in Garden Grove, CA, on 26 and 27 July 
2007. The purpose of this chapter is to conclude whether the 
DoD is using Incentive Award-fees correctly. The conceptual 
summary will begin to answer the general question: “Is the 
DoD using Incentive and Award-fees appropriately?” and the 
principle conclusion will summarize the information obtained 
from the surveys and research attained in addition to the 
three statements made by the GAO relating to the DoD and its 
use of Incentive and Award-fees. Then recommendations and 
areas for further research will complete this chapter. 
B. ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES PRINCIPLE CONCLUSIONS 
1. Conceptual Summary 
In reviewing the data collected during the research, 
the researchers highlighted several problems in relation to 
the method in which the DoD utilizes Incentive and Award-
fees to motivate contractor performance. The conclusions 
associated with research vary, however, when compared to the 
GAO reports analyzed in our research. Indeed, it appears 
there are clear discrepancies in the implementation and 
administration of Incentive and Award-fee contracts, and 
those inconsistencies prevent the contracts from working as 
originally intended. The major effects of under-utilizing 
the Incentive and Award-fee process are financially costly 
 114
and can ultimately freeze a mission. A change is necessary, 
but the question is, what other changes have to occur to 
improve the way Incentive and Award-fee contracts are 
enforced?  Policies and guides are in place, but the 
training and oversight to enforce these policies and guides 
are not apparent (per contracts reviewed by the GAO). The 
research clearly indicates that changes are necessary. But 
in most cases, it appears changes or improvements would 
improve efficiency, not necessarily effectiveness.  
2. Principle Conclusions  
The conclusions of this study are based on the analysis 
of the respondents primarily compared and contrasted to the 
GAO reports 06-66 and 06-409T. This study examined the 
improper use and administration of Incentive and Award-fees.  
The research gathered feedback based on anonymous surveys 
provided at the 45th Annual Aerospace and Defense Contract 
Management Conference. The intent of the research was to 
analyze the findings by surveying a sample population. 
Excerpts from the GAO reports placed in a Likert model 
survey gave the researchers qualitative information to 
determine if the GAO’s findings are reflective of the 
administrative and contractual actions of the Government and 
industry contract managers. Three of the main findings of 
the GAO were that the DoD: 
• Evaluates contractors on Award-fee criteria that are 
not directly related to key acquisition outcomes, 
 
• Pays  contractors  a significant portion of the 
available fee for what award plans describe as 
“acceptable, average, expected of satisfactory 
performance”, and 
• Gives the contractors at least a second opportunity to 
earn initially unearned or deferred fees. (GAO, 2005,  
Intro)   
 
 115
The first statement listed above refers to Government 
personnel tying Award-fees to program outcome. The GAO 
reports stated that DoD programs did not structure Award-
fees in a way that motivates contractors to achieve (or 
holds contractors accountable for achieving) desired 
acquisition outcomes. Almost half of the Government 
personnel surveyed agreed with this statement.  Tying Award-
fees in to program outcome are both the recommendations from 
James I. Finley (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 2006, 
March 29) and the GAO.  
Statement two listed above from the GAO states that the 
Government is giving a significant portion (more than 50%) 
of the available Award-fee to the contractor for 
satisfactory performance. 46.2% of the Government 
respondents agreed with this statement based on the analysis 
of Statement 4 of the Government survey.  Policy written in 
2006 by James I. Finley and Shay Assad (Director of Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy), recommend the following 
criteria: awarding zero fees for an unsatisfactory rating, 
no more than 50% for a satisfactory rating, 50%-75% for a 
good rating, 75%-90% for an excellent rating, and 90%-100% 
for an outstanding rating (GAO, 2007; NCMA, 2006).  
Statement three above states that the DoD gives the 
contractors at least a second opportunity to earn initially 
unearned or deferred fees, referred to as “rollovers.”  More 
than 50% of the Government agreed with this statement, while 
the majority of contractors stayed neutral. Policy written 
in 2006 by James I. Finley also addressed when to roll over 
Award-fees. Award-fee Guides written for each service branch 
mention that rolling over Award-fees should only occur in 
exceptional cases to maintain the integrity of the Award-fee 
evaluation process.  The policy is in place, but it is 
ultimately up to the PM and the FDO to ensure enforcement.  
Incentive and Award-fee contracts offer the Government 
a tool to allow the contractor to achieve exceptional 
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performance, if used correctly.  The Government must fully 
understand how to relate performance evaluation factors to 
the program outcome, and then communicate that relationship 
clearly to the contractor.  Partnerships between both 
parties can create more risk-sharing and open communication 
that may mitigate future acquisition delays and cost 
overruns—a relationship that starts at the planning stage of 
the acquisition.      
The research supported the GAO’s contention that the 
DoD could improve: training, use, and administration of IF 
and AF contracts. With policy available, contract managers 
should focus on these key areas to make the use of Incentive 
and Award-fees more effective. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Additionally, the researchers believe that there are 
benefits from qualitative research on GAO reports. The 
following recommendations are made: 
1. GAO  
• When analyzing DoD procurement, separate the 
analysis by magnitude. The researchers suggest 
that there is a tremendous disparity between the 
programs analyzed by the GAO and those “lesser 
dollar” procurements utilizing Award and Incentive 
Fee structures. Changing the magnitude of projects 
analyzed may present different results. 
• Assist in developing a database that uses 
procurement information for internal use. The 
sharing of information and instant access to 
metrics is deemed as a critical concern for the 
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GAO.   The GAO undoubtedly has seen the 
intricacies of many organizations in the federal 
Government, and, therefore, may assist in 
providing a transferrable operation for beta 
testing. 
2. Industry 
• Ensure that the proposal submission is realistic 
based on actual cost.  If all bid proposals are 
accurate by this measure, this may urge the DoD to 
reevaluate its future budgetary requests and cost 
estimates for complex programs. 
• Collaborate with the DoD to educate the Department 
on effective incentives for industry corporations 
and cost-estimating. 
• Collaborate with the DoD to self-evaluate the 
corporation’s performance.  This assessment can 
assist in identifying both the areas of 
improvement and the areas of excellence prior to a 
fee award. 
3. Government  
• Reestablish structured, disciplined acquisition 
processes. 
• Invest in the rebuilding and knowledge 
rehabilitation of the Acquisition workforce. 
• Strengthen partnerships for information sharing 
between services, departments, and industry. 
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• Contract structure and incentives linked to 
mission success and/or other objective 
requirements. 
• Utilize hybrid incentive contracts minimizing 
over-complexity, while addressing issues linked to 
cost schedule and performance. (Pawlikowski, 2007)  
The researchers recommend both agencies (the GAO and 
DoD) focus on opposite ends of the spectrum to meet a common 
goal.  With the GAO focusing on “where” the problem is 
generated and at what magnitude, the DoD can effectively 
tailor the above recommendations to efficiently mitigate GAO 
findings. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Government Acquisition 
To further analyze this information, the researchers 
conclude that this area can be investigated more in the 
areas of magnitude (considering the sample size surveyed), 
service analysis, type of program analysis (i.e., 
shipbuilding, aircraft procurement, tank procurement), and 
funding availability.  Segregation of projects in these 
areas may depict a trend in areas that use Award and 
Incentive Fees appropriately, as well as show consistent 
results.  If it is discovered that particular programs and 
or services continue to properly incentivize contractors, 
the DoD and industry should analyze the factors that 
contributed to the success of that program.  Researchers can 
then examine whether the success of the program is 
commensurate to GAO suggestions.  
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Additionally, in efforts to understand GAO citations in 
the reports, contracting personnel must pay closer attention 
to the entire Award and Incentive Fee process as a whole.  
By this, the researchers have concluded (based on the survey 
that was posed to industry and the collective data that was 
utilized by the GAO) that their data analysis does reflect 
the majority of the contracts utilizing Award and Incentive 
Fees properly. By investigating only the programs with 
contract fees of $10M, the GAO isolates many successful 
program endeavors using Incentive Fee structures. There are 
programs that successfully distribute Award and Incentive 
Fees; these, however, were not captured in GAO’s analysis. 
Furthermore, the programs analyzed by the GAO that have 
well-known Nunn-McCurdy breaches, such as the Space-based 
Inferred Systems, can be considered outliers to how the 
majority of the acquisition community operates under Award 
and Incentive Fees. Other programs that were evaluated have 
significantly high risks—such as the Comanche reconnaissance 
attack helicopter, F/A 22 Raptor tactical fighter aircraft, 
and the Joint Strike Fighter tactical fighter aircraft (GAO, 
2005, December).  The GAO’s specific focus of contracts 
implies that these particular programs are the norm and 
negates the intangible net benefits that are difficult to 
measure. 
The GAO did not take into consideration many of the 
non-quantitative benefits associated with the continuation 
of the procurement, for instance critical acquisitions for 
supporting war-fighter capabilities.  In many cases, these 
intangible benefits can be derived in many different facets.  
These items can be subjective in nature; however, they can 
affect the result of a cost-benefit analysis.  If the GAO 
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had begun to use this methodology in its algorithmic 
equation, there remains a probability that the benefits of 
the overall costs would outweigh the cost attributed to the 
described overruns in the reports.  For future research, the 
intangible benefits that are associated with many programs 
should be computed into the GAO numerical estimates of +/- 
25% that concludes the DoD is wasting $8 billion dollars.  
Although the GAO states “inadequate funding” can 
adversely affect acquisitions in its opening statement to 
Congress, the issue is not brought to the forefront again in 
the entire report.  As a basis for further research, the GAO 
should consider evaluating the adverse effects of having 
inadequate project funding   this leads to consistent 
criticism relating to the inflated cost associated with many 
acquisition programs.  The GAO lists many reports in its 
reference list that relate best practices discovered by 
acquisition programs; unfortunately, the GAO neglects to 
focus on one of the primary drivers of acquisition: the 
funding.  The GAO should evaluate the initial funding 
instead of starting from the end result of the issue, such 
as Award and Incentive Fees Fee structure), the GAO should 
consider reviewing the inputs prior to starting the 
Acquisition process.  Such examples with final cost of 
procurements.  Examples include, but are not limited to, the 
PPBE, politics, and the user requirements for the 
acquisition. documents to determine feasibility. By gaining 
knowledge on how these issues affect the acquisition 
process, the GAO may assist the procurement community in 
mitigating these problems for larger acquisitions.  
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Many contract actions require an intimate knowledge of 
the FAR and the PPBE.  Not only should the IPT and the 
contracting officer understand the acquisition process, it 
is equally advantageous for the team to acquire in-depth 
knowledge of the product that is being acquired.  According 
to the GAO, one of the “successful use(s) of fees is 
supported by the level of product knowledge attained by 
officials and their ability to leverage this knowledge” 
(GAO, 2005, December, p. 30). The GAO cites the example of 
the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile.  One reason for 
the success of the program is the competent understanding of 
the acquisition IPT.  Contracting officers and the IPT must 
understand that the acquisition process is an ongoing 
development on both sides. As technology and other variable 
inputs change, it is essential that DOD contract managers 
are constantly monitoring, looking for, and mitigating 
associated risks. “Success does exist at the individual 
contract level, but DOD will need to leverage this knowledge 
if it hopes to identify proven Incentive Fee strategies 
across a wide variety of DOD Acquisitions” (GAO, 2005, 
December, p. 33). According to the GAO:   
The fundamental lack of knowledge and program 
instability is consistently cited as the main 
reasons for DOD’s poor acquisition outcomes. DOD 
uses these fees in an attempt to mitigate the 
risks that it creates through a flawed approach. 
(p. 33) 
In conclusion, the Government, with the assistance of 
GAO, should analyze the following: 
• The impact of Government delays 
• The impact of insufficient funds 
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• Intangible benefits of continued progress 
• Smaller acquisitions utilizing Award and Incentive 
Fees 
These remedies may assist in de-scoping a difficult issue so 
that it is easier to grasp conceptually.  
2. Industry  
The researchers recommend that further research be 
committed to evaluating best practices of innovative 
companies in the 21st century. These successful corporations 
may offer the DoD a glimpse into effective Incentive Fee 
practices that give desired results. Some of the recommended 
companies are Google and Yahoo, just to name two. Although 
these firms primarily deal in IT, the researchers believe 
that there may be processes that can be implemented in the 
DoD, much like that of Toyota’s “lean” principle that the 
Government continuously attempts to apply as a one-size-
fits-all solution.   
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APPENDIX A. NASA AWARD-FEE CONTRACTING GUIDE 
3.6.1 Award-fee Rating Table  
NASA uses the rating table below for all Award-fee 
contracts. It includes adjectival ratings as well as a 
numerical scoring system of 0-100. The Earned Award-fee 
(or interim Award-fee amounts in the case of interim 
evaluations) is calculated by applying the total 
numerical score to the Award-fee pool.  For example, a 
numerical score of 85 yields an Award-fee of 85 percent 
of the Award-fee pool for that evaluation period.  The 
table below lists the Award-fee evaluation adjectival 
ratings with their corresponding score ranges.  In 
addition, a narrative description is also provided to 
assist the Performance Evaluation Board in applying the 
ratings. Criteria for evaluation factors and sub-










Of exceptional merit; exemplary 
performance in a timely, 
efficient and economical manner; 
very minor (if any) deficiencies 
with no adverse effect on overall 
performance. 
Very Good  (90-81) 
Very effective performance, fully 
responsive to contract 
requirements; contract 
requirements accomplished in a 
timely, efficient and economical 
manner for the most part; only 
minor deficiencies. 
Good  (80-71) 
Effective performance; fully 
responsive to contract 
requirements; reportable 
deficiencies, but with little 
identifiable effect on overall 
performance. 
Satisfactory (70-61) Meets or slightly exceeds minimum acceptable standards; adequate 
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results; reportable deficiencies 
with identifiable, but not 
substantial, effects on overall 
performance.  
Poor/ 
Unsatisfactory (< 61) 
Does not meet minimum acceptable 
standards in one or more areas; 
remedial action required in one 
or more areas; deficiencies in 
one or more areas, which
adversely affect overall 
performance. 
• Any factor receiving a grade of “Poor/ Unsatisfactory” 
(less than 61 points) will be assigned zero performance 
points for purposes of calculating the Award-fee amount 
(includes cost performance).  
• The contractor will not be paid ANY Award-fee when the 
total Award-fee score is "Poor/Unsatisfactory" (less 
than 61 points).   
• In order to earn a total overall rating of "Excellent," 
the contractor must be under cost, on or ahead of 
schedule, and be rated "Excellent" for Technical 












APPENDIX B. AWARD-FEE FINDINGS AND DETERMINATION 
This constitutes a determination of Award-fee earned by 
(Contractor’s Name), under 
Contract (#ABC) with the (Government). 
The Performance Evaluation Board, acting under the authority 
of the Award-fee plan and Contract #(ABC), has completed its 
evaluation of the contractor's performance for the period 
(date) through (date). 
The Board's assessment of the contractor's performance and 
its recommendation to the undersigned Fee Determination 
Official for the aforementioned period is a rating of 
(Excellent, Good, Satisfactory, or Unsatisfactory) with a 
score of (0%-100%) which equates to a recommended Award-fee 
in the amount of ($__). 
FINDINGS 
Upon review of the Board's considerations in arriving at its 
recommendation and the contractor's response thereto, I 
hereby find the (0%-100%), an (Excellent, Good, 
Satisfactory, or Unsatisfactory) rating, to be a proper 
assessment of the contractor's performance for the stated 
period. 
DETERMINATION 
The contract provides for a potential Award-fee of ($__) for 
the current evaluation period. 
Based upon the findings set forth above, I hereby determine 
that the contractor is awarded fee, pursuant to Contract 
#(ABC) in the amount of ($__) for the period ending  (date). 
John I. Doe 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 127
APPENDIX C. GOVERNEMENT SURVEY 
This questionnaire is anonymous; DO NOT provide 
your name and or ANY organizational information. 
Recent GAO reports have stated the “DOD has paid billions in 
Award and Incentive Fees regardless of acquisition outcomes” 
and that the “DOD wastes billions through poorly structured 
Incentive Fees.”  The purpose of this questionnaire is to 
survey contract managers, to assess your opinion of DoD 
Award and Incentive Fees on DoD contracts.  The GAO 
determined that contractors were awarded Award-fees for 
meeting basic contract requirements.  FAR section 16 
outlines the procedures and methodologies in which Award and 
Incentive Fees are utilized. The GAO report indicates that 
these guidelines are not being properly applied or followed. 
 
1 = Strongly Agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Strongly Disagree 
 
The DoD Acquisition process for weapons programs 
consistently yields undesirable consequences: cost 
increases, late deliveries to the war-fighter, and 
performance shortfalls. 
1   2   3   4  5  
Award and Incentive Fee are not effective tools for 
achieving the DoD desired Acquisition outcomes. 
1   2   3   4  5 
  
The DoD gives contractors multiple chances to earn Award-
fees that they failed to earn in previous evaluation 
periods, informally known as “roll over.” 
1   2   3   4  5  
The DoD frequently pays most of the available Award-fee for 
what it describes as improved contractor performance, 
regardless of whether outcomes fell short of, met, or 
exceeded expectations. 
1   2   3   4  5  
The DoD pays contractors Award-fees for satisfactory 
performance even though the acquisition regulations and 
guidance intend for such fees to be used to motivate 
excellent performance. 
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1   2   3   4  5 
Monetary Incentive Fees provisions improve performance on 
DoD contracts. 
1   2   3   4  5  
In the development and administration of Award-fee and 
Incentive Fees, training is inadequate. 
1   2   3   4  5  
Competitions for funding on contracts in systems 
acquisitions lead to underestimated costs and over-promised 
capabilities. 
1   2   3   4  5 
Outcome-based Award-fee criteria that are both achievable 
and promote accountability for acquisition outcomes will 
optimize Award-fees. 
1   2   3   4  5 
The DoD Award-fee structures motivate excellent contractor 
performance by only paying Award-fees for excellent 
performance. 
1   2   3   4  5 
The DoD has a mechanism for capturing Award and Incentive 
Fees fee data within existing data systems. 
1   2   3   4  5 
The DoD shares proven Incentive Fees strategies for the 
acquisition of different types of products and services with 
contracting and program officials across the DoD. 
1   2   3   4  5 
The DoD has developed performance measures to evaluate the 
effectiveness of Award and Incentive Fees as a tool for 
improving contractor performance and achieving desired 
program outcomes. 
1   2   3   4  5 
Please provide any additional information in this comments 













APPENDIX D. CONTRACTOR SURVEY 
This questionnaire is anonymous; DO NOT provide 
your name and or ANY organizational information. 
Recent GAO reports have stated the “DOD has paid billions in 
Award and Incentive Fees regardless of acquisition outcomes” 
and that the “DOD wastes billions through poorly structured 
Incentive Fees.”  The purpose of this questionnaire is to 
survey contract managers to assess your opinion of DoD Award 
and Incentive Fees on DoD contracts. The GAO determined that 
contractors were awarded Award-fees for meeting basic 
contract requirements.  FAR section 16 outlines the 
procedures and methodologies in which Award and Incentive 
Fees are utilized. The GAO report indicates that these 
guidelines are not being properly applied or followed. 
 
 
1 = Strongly Agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Strongly Disagree 
 
 
The DoD Acquisition process for weapons programs 
consistently yields undesirable consequences: cost 
increases, late deliveries to the war-fighter and 
performance shortfalls. 
1   2   3   4  5 
Award and Incentive Fees are not effective tools for 
achieving the DoD desired Acquisition outcomes. 
1   2   3   4  5 
The DoD gives contractors multiple chances to earn Award-
fees that they failed to earn in previous evaluation 
periods, informally known as “roll over.” 
1   2   3   4  5  
Monetary Incentive Fees provisions improve performance on 
DoD contracts. 
1   2   3   4  5 
Competitions for funding on contracts in systems 
acquisitions lead to underestimated costs and over-promised 
capabilities. 
 
1   2   3   4  5 
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Outcome-based Award-fee criteria that are both achievable 
and promote accountability for acquisition outcomes will 
optimize Award-fees. 
1   2   3   4  5 
The DoD Award-fee structures motivate excellent performance 
by only paying Award-fees for excellent performance. 
1   2   3   4  5 
 
Please provide any additional information in this comments 
























APPENDIX E. SURVEY RESPONSE PERCENTAGES 
 




 Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
 Disagree 
CQ1 11.80% 23.70% 29.00% 32.90% 2.60%
GQ1 15.40% 23.10% 34.60% 19.20% 7.70%
CQ2 5.30% 23.70% 11.80% 42.10% 17.10%
GQ2 11.50% 15.40% 19.20% 15.40% 38.50%
CQ3 5.30% 19.70% 42.10% 31.60% 1.30%
GQ3 11.50% 42.30% 26.90% 15.40% 3.90%
CQ4 17.10% 42.10% 19.70% 15.80% 5.30%
GQ6 15.40% 34.60% 23.10% 15.40% 11.50%
CQ5 19.70% 35.50% 14.50% 21.10% 9.20%
GQ8 20.00% 44.00% 12.00% 20.00% 4.00%
CQ6 15.80% 53.90% 18.40% 9.20% 2.70%
GQ9 16.00% 68.00% 4.00% 12.00% 0.00%
CQ7 1.30% 28.90% 40.80% 25.10% 3.90%
GQ10 4.00% 20.00% 12.00% 48.00% 16.00%
            
            
GQ4 19.30% 26.90% 26.90% 26.90% 0.00%
GQ5 23.10% 42.30% 15.40% 19.20% 0.00%
GQ7 50.00% 42.30% 0.00% 7.70% 0.00%
GQ11 3.80% 26.90% 15.50% 42.30% 11.50%
GQ12 0.00% 23.00% 30.80% 38.50% 7.70%
GQ13   34.60% 15.40% 38.50% 11.50%
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